From newshub.ccs.yorku.ca!torn!cs.utexas.edu!uwm.edu!rpi!gatech!concert!sas!mozart.unx.sas.com!sasmsr Wed Oct 14 14:58:51 EDT 1992
Article 7230 of comp.ai.philosophy:
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>From: sasmsr@zinfande.unx.sas.com (Mark S. Riggle)
Subject: Re: Ginsberg & Human intelligence vs. Machine intelligence
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Date: Mon, 12 Oct 1992 13:35:17 GMT
References: <MOFFAT.92Oct7105034@uvapsy.psy.uva.nl> <1992Oct7.151533.7822@CSD-NewsHost.Stanford.EDU> <BvytMD.9FC@cs.bham.ac.uk> <1992Oct11.200006.685@CSD-NewsHost.Stanford.EDU>
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Keywords: penrose, church-turing hypothesis
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In article <1992Oct11.200006.685@CSD-NewsHost.Stanford.EDU>, ginsberg@t.Stanford.EDU (Matthew L. Ginsberg) writes:
|> 
|> I don't want to get involved in this, really I don't.  Let me only
|> state what I think the argument is about:
|> 
|> By "strong AI" is meant, I believe, the view that an algorithm can
|> respond to stimulus in a way exhibiting intelligence.  Strong AI is
|> important because -- among other things -- it provides the fundamental
|> justification for the continued support of our field.
|> 
|> Penrose says that the strong AI thesis is wrong.  His argument, very
|> briefly, is that Godel's theorem is the linchpin in a proof that the
|> behavior of mathematicians cannot be duplicated by algorithmic
|> methods.  
<stuff deleted>

|> 
|> 						Matt Ginsberg
|> 
|> 

I believe that Godel's theorem is NOT the linchpin in Penrose's
argument.  It is important, but he merely uses Godel's theorem
to show the limitations of the computablity of currently
realizable computers. His linchpin conjecture is that
consciousness is based on the collapse of the quantum
probability distribution.  You know, Schrodinger's cat and all
that. In schrodinger's cat thought experiment, consciousness as
part of the measurement process causes the collapse.  Penrose
turns this around and conjectures that the collapse is
responsible for providing the 'ultra-computation' required for
consciousness and the collapse is caused by quantum gravity
effects.  He then needs to claim that the effects of this
collapse are not computable in a fundamental way.  In his view,
it is not a problem of precsion in computing the physical
states.  It is fundamentally not computable, and he does offer
some weak evidence of that.  He also allows that it could be
done outside an organic brain by a quantum computer and he
indicated that someone (I forgot who) was actually making
progress with that approach.  So in a sense, Penrose has made a
strong AI claim of his own, just deeper and more obscure and
needing a special physical process.

This argument of his really takes about 5 pages in the book,
the rest is all basic education needed to understand the
argument.

-- 
=========================================================
Mark Riggle                         | "Give me a  LAMBDA large  enough
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