From newshub.ccs.yorku.ca!torn!cs.utexas.edu!sun-barr!west.West.Sun.COM!smaug.West.Sun.COM!dab Thu Oct  8 10:11:27 EDT 1992
Article 7136 of comp.ai.philosophy:
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>From: dab@ism.isc.com (Dave Butterfield)
Newsgroups: comp.ai.philosophy
Subject: Re: Grounding
Date: 6 Oct 1992 19:40:55 GMT
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References: <718221542@sheol.UUCP> <1992Oct5.195433.9320@spss.com> <26604@castle.ed.ac.uk>
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cam@castle.ed.ac.uk (Chris Malcolm) writes:
>it is a commonplace illusion among philosophy students that they _are_
>entirely symbolic in their cognitive functions, e.g., the common
>belief that is impossible to think without thinking in (something
>like) words.

Why do you say that this is an illusion?  A symbol is anything
that represents meaning.  What sort of thinking do you suppose
occurs *without* the use of symbols?

-- 
	I output a string of symbols and I observe the response.


