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From: David Yeo <dyeo@tortoise>
Subject: Re: AI's Misconceptions & The Appropriate Role of Psychology? 
In-Reply-To: <855325699snz@longley.demon.co.uk> 
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References: <Pine.SOL.3.91.970206184449.16269B-100000@tortoise> <855325699snz@longley.demon.co.uk> 
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Date: Fri, 7 Feb 1997 16:24:33 GMT
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Xref: glinda.oz.cs.cmu.edu comp.ai.philosophy:51831 comp.ai:44047 sci.psychology.theory:6135

On Fri, 7 Feb 1997, David Longley wrote:

> In article <Pine.SOL.3.91.970206184449.16269B-100000@tortoise>
>            dyeo@tortoise "David Yeo" writes:
> 
> > As I have alluded to in previous postings, this is where your sanitized
> > utopian rationalism invariably gets dirty.  For Quine makes it clear that
> > theory touches the "real world" only at the edges. 
> > 
> 
> There  is NOTHING utopian or "rationalist" about what I have said.  It 
> is a thoroughly empiricist programme.

That is where you delude yourself. For all your pretences to empiricism,
your programme merely restates the rationalist ideal "... that reason has
precedence over other ways of acquiring knowledge or, more strongly, that
it is the unique path to knowledge" (Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy). 
More kindly, your minimisation of the role (and perils) associated with
empiricist tenet that "the senses are primary with respect to knowledge" 
(ibid) gives the false and even misleading impression that science is the
sterile logical manipulation of accepted propositions. 

To show how rooted in rationalism your programme really is, contrast with
the view that induction is the essence of science, and that the deduction
merely tests the merits of those inductions. 

> If  you  read it more carefully you will see that I  am  abvocating  a 
> system which requires one to analyse data put into a database. 

If YOU read more carefully what *I* (and others) write, you will see that
this "analysis" involves more than merely counting events or assigning
probability.  I suggest you read (and understand the implications of) the
literature on induction and concept formation before responding. 

<marginally related extract from "Fragments" snipped>
 
> As  to the "real world" at its edges, there is much more to  "the 
> real  world"  than what one immediately sees  with  ones  unaided 
> perceptual systems.

It is just this sort of comment that shows how much to the rationalist 
end of the empiricist-rationalist continuum your philosophy lies.

> 
> > The value one gives to a variable is a function of the values given to
> > other variables in the system.  As such the value of a variable is only
> > one of a set of plausible values it can validly assume when the entire
> > "web of belief" is considered.  This is not only the basis of Quine's
> > indeterminacy of translation hypothesis it is, I think, in large part the
> > rationale underlying the notion of situated cognition.  Thus even if it
> > was possible (which, due to the number of propositions involved, it's not)
> > to apply your rationalist philosophy, different instantiations lead to
> > different (even contradictory) conclusions. 
> 
> You have run off on your own agenda here (as you have frequently quite 
> lately). If you seriously wanty to discuss these issues I am happy  to 
> do  so, but please make the effort to read what I have written in  the 
> first place.

Since we are debating a point, unless I mindlessly spew out quotes <g>,
how could what I say be anything other than my own agenda?  This sort of
ad hominem "retort" merely evades the issues (which are based on Quine).

> 
> > 
> > In short, the best one can hope for in your rationalist utopia is internal
> > consistency within a highly restricted closed system of beliefs. 
> > 
> 
> This  is  nonsense. The data dictionary is open to  new  observations. 

Yes, but what is observed?  And what is the network of assumptions which
supports (determines) the eventual classification of these observations?  
These are important, indeed fundamental, questions your doctrine ignores.

Cheers,

- David Yeo (Applied Cognitive Science, University of Toronto)
