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From: David Yeo <dyeo@tortoise>
Subject: Re: On the Nature of Artificial Intelligence and Science 
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Date: Mon, 13 Jan 1997 22:36:28 GMT
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Xref: glinda.oz.cs.cmu.edu comp.ai.philosophy:51002 comp.ai:43418 sci.psychology.theory:5953

On Mon, 13 Jan 1997, David Longley wrote:
 
> The  subtley  lies  in my insistance that  one  reconstrues  what 
> Bruner  originally had to say, something of a gestlat  switch  in 
> fact.
> 
>     'The  most characteristic thing about mental life,  over 
>     and  beyond the fact that one apprehends the  events  of 
>     the world around one, is that one constantly goes beyond 
>     the information given'.

Since "mental life" invariably underlies all of our scientific endeavours,
does it not also follow that "going beyond the information given" is true 
of the extentional sphere as well?  If not, why not? 

>     J Bruner (1957)
>     Going Beyond The Information Given
>     (in H Gulber and others (eds)
>     Contemporary Approaches to Cognition)
> 
> And then:
> 
>     "In  the  1970's, Cognitive Science  was  formulated  in 
>     terms  of Putnam's doctrine of functionalism,  in  which 
>     mental  states are the functional states of an  abstract 
>     digital   computer,   thinking   is   abstract    symbol 
>     manipulation as in the operation of a computer  program, 
>     and  the  mind's symbols get their meaning  by  denoting 
>     things in the world. Functionalism has since become  the 
>     mainstream  doctrine within the philosophy of mind.  But 
>     in  the  mid-1970's,  overwhelming  empirical   evidence 
>     against functionalism began to pile up, and in the  late 
>     1970's,   Putnam  himself  found  functionalism  to   be 
>     logically incoherent. In this volume, Putnam brilliantly 
>     reveals  the philosophical fallacies in the doctrine  he 
>     founded,  showing  why  functionalism  must  fail  as  a 
>     philosophy of mind. The fall of functionalism has  major 
>     consequences  for  generative  linguistics,   artificial 
>     intelligence,    and   cognitive    and    developmental 
>     psychology".
> 
>     Lakoff (1988). 
>
> Which is a vindication of what Skinner long argued.
> 
>     'Cognitive  psychology  is  frequently  presented  as  a 
>     revolt against behaviorism,  but it is not a revolt,  it 
>     is  a   retreat.  Everyday English  is   full  of  terms 
>     derived from ancient  explanations  of human   behavior. 
>     We  spoke  that language when we were  young.   When  we  
>     went  out  into the world and became  psychologists,  we  
>     learned to  speak  in  other ways but made mistakes  for  
>     which   we   were  punished.  But  now  we  can   relax. 
>     Cognitive  psychology  is Old  Home Week.  We  are  back 
>     among friends speaking the language  we  spoke when   we  
>     were growing up. We can talk about love  and  will   and 
>     ideas  and memories and feelings and states of mind, and  
>     no   one will ask us what we mean; no one will raise  an 
>     eyebrow.'
>     
>     ('The Shame of American Education')
>     B.F. Skinner 1987
>     
>     'I    accuse   cognitive  scientists   of   emasculating   
>     laboratory research  by  substituting  descriptions   of  
>     settings  for   the settings  themselves and reports  of 
>     intentions  and  expectations for action.
>     
>     I   accuse  cognitive  scientists of reviving a   theory  
>     in  which feelings  and states of mind observed  through  
>     introspection   are  taken  as the  causes  of  behavior 
>     rather than as collateral effects of the causes.
>     
>     I  accuse  cognitive  scientists,  as  I  would   accuse  
>     psychoanalysts,  of  claiming to explore the  depths  of 
>     human behavior, of inventing explanatory  systems   that  
>     are  admired  for  a  profundity  more  properly  called 
>     inaccessibility.
>      
>     I  accuse cognitive scientists of relaxing standards  of 
>     definition  and   logical  thinking  and   releasing   a  
>     flood   of  speculation characteristic  of  metaphysics, 
>     literature, and daily intercourse, speculation   perhaps 
>     suitable enough in such arenas but  inimical to science.
>     
>     Let us bring behaviorism back from the Devil's Island to 
>     which  it  was  transported  for  a   crime   it   never  
>     committed,   and    let psychology become once  again  a 
>     behavioral science.' 
>     
>     ('Cognitive Science and Behaviorism')
>     B.F. Skinner 1987

Since the above has nothing to do with the point we were discussing, I can
only assume that you're either "trolling" (trying to provoke a response),
or that your "quotematic" has keyed on the fact that I identify myself as
a member of U of T's Applied Cognitive Science department, causing it to
spew forth a set of (marginally) related quotes. 

In any event, as I (and others) have noted repeatedly, Cognitive Science
was founded as a composite discipline, with the primary goal of combining
information from all of the so-called "cognitive sciences". To the extent
that Lakoff and Skinner are referring to the (formerly) dominant approach
to cognitive science, much of what they note has merit.  But as either a
representation of, or a condemnation of, the discipline as a whole, it's
virtually worthless.  It is akin to claiming psychology = psychoanalysis,
and then arguing that psychology should be abandoned because of the well
documented inadequacies of the psychoanalytic approach. 

Cheers,

- David Yeo (Applied Cognitive Science, University of Toronto)
