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From: pindor@gpu.utcc.utoronto.ca (Andrzej Pindor)
Subject: Re: Grounding Representations: ("Grounding" is the wrong word)
Message-ID: <D93IAn.1tK@gpu.utcc.utoronto.ca>
Organization: UTCC Public Access
References: <3nhlk5$i7o@percy.cs.bham.ac.uk> <800610473snz@chatham.demon.co.uk> <800658816snz@grithill.demon.co.uk> <3poru1$s9u@percy.cs.bham.ac.uk>
Date: Wed, 24 May 1995 18:35:10 GMT
Lines: 68
Xref: glinda.oz.cs.cmu.edu comp.ai.philosophy:28315 comp.ai:30105 comp.robotics:21055 comp.cog-eng:3167 sci.cognitive:7718 sci.psychology:41905

In article <3poru1$s9u@percy.cs.bham.ac.uk>,
Aaron Sloman <A.Sloman@cs.bham.ac.uk> wrote:
>robin walker <rwalker@grithill.demon.co.uk> writes:
>
>> Date: 17 May 1995 06:48:48 +0100
>> Organization: L.B.S.
>
>> ......
>
>> Returning, briefly, to the poor ungrounded mathematician in his sea of random
>> grey flecks, he suffers the same problem as the kitten: the disposition to
>> understand number theory may fade in the absence of confirmatory signals
>> from the environment and in due course his mind will be grounded in, well,
>> grey flecks. Sensory deprivation tests indicate that something like this
>> does occur.
>>
>> --
>> Robin Walker
>
>A well-designed disconnected mathematician (unlike humamns) might
>not have this problem.
>
>The internal investigation of properties of numbers, groups,
>algorithms, equations, collections of axioms, proofs, etc. might
>provide sufficient stimulation to keep the system going
>indefinitely, providing joys and sorrows, excitement and
>disappointment, the thrill of achievement, and hopes dashed by
>counter-examples -- as long as someone or something provided the
>required source of energy to drive the engine that performed all
>these computations.
>
I'd venture that part of the problem of loosing grounding under conditions 
of sensory deprivation in case of humans might be permanency (or a lack 
thereof) of human memory. It seems that models constructed by the brain have
a large amount of arbitrariness to them and do not seem to be strongly
constrained by rules which we find the reality to follow. We need a constant 
feedback from our senses to keep our imagination in check. Under conditions
of sensory deprivation the memory of real world constraints seem to decay and
our imagination "runs wild". As a consequence we loose an ability to evaluate
various mental models and simulations and loose our motivations - nothing seems
"to matter". Whether an artificial disconnected (a.d.) mathematician would have
this problem might depend on its architecture and physical properties of its
hardware components.

>The happy ungrounded mathematician need have no knowledge of this
>external benefaction, and might even lack the concepts required to
>care about it.
>
It may very well be that if the a.d. mathematician did not have the problem
described above it might also lack motivation. It seems to me that our joy
and motivations come ultimately from consistency between mental models and
input from the senses. If we imposed (or programmed in) something corresponding
to the input from the senses, it would offer only a finite range of possibili-
ties, whereas the input from the real world is not so constrained. Note
that it sometimes happens for humans that they think that they have "seen
it all" and often such people seem to loose motivations, loose a will to live.

>Of course, I am not saying that anything like this is to be found
>among animals, human or non-human.
>
>Aaron
>---
Andrzej
-- 
Andrzej Pindor                        The foolish reject what they see and 
University of Toronto                 not what they think; the wise reject
Instructional and Research Computing  what they think and not what they see.
pindor@gpu.utcc.utoronto.ca                           Huang Po
