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From: stevens@prodigal.psych.rochester.edu (Greg Stevens)
Subject: Re: Thought Question
Message-ID: <1995Jan6.031214.1563@galileo.cc.rochester.edu>
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Date: Fri, 6 Jan 95 03:12:14 GMT
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In <3ei35h$9qr@mp.cs.niu.edu> rickert@cs.niu.edu (Neil Rickert) writes:
>In <1995Jan5.234325.23626@galileo.cc.rochester.edu> stevens@prodigal.psych.rochester.edu (Greg Stevens) writes:
>>In <3ehfrl$21c@mp.cs.niu.edu> rickert@cs.niu.edu (Neil Rickert) writes:
>>>In <1995Jan5.171036.9836@galileo.cc.rochester.edu> stevens@prodigal.psych.rochester.edu (Greg Stevens) writes:

>>>>.... "Every process is an embodiment of the underlying formal
>>>>description which describes it."

>>>While I can see your point, I am inclined to disagree.  Your way of
>>>describing things presumes that there is an underlying formal
>>>description.  But often we simulate when we do not have a formal
>>>description.  

>>First of all, saying "there exists a formal description" (as in "in
>>some platonic universe) is different from saying "we have a formal
>>description" (as in we have discovered it).

>Agreed.  But assuming that there is _a_ formal system would seem to
>be contrary to your position against there being an _objective_
>reality.

Indeed.  I'm just exploring some of the consequences of taking the platonic
view to its extreme.  I don't believe it, I just think it is interesting.
I was merely suggesting that one consider how one would react to the
notion of "We are all simply embodiments of a preexisting algorithm,"
as that statement is an implication of an extreme form of platonic
philosophy.  I think it is interesting to think about things that way,
though I disagree with it in the same way I don't think numbers exist
or were "discovered," but merely that they are social constructs.

>>>There is another point to bear in mind.  We may talk of simulating
>>>X.  But in practice, we rarely simulate X.  Normally, we simulate
>>>certain aspects of X.  Often the aspects to be simulated may be
>>>unstated, and understood from context.

>>First of all, for any catagory X there may be some items which are
>>relevant to X being the description of a phenomenon and some not.
>>For example, in an actual election, there are characteristics of
>>the human instantiation, i.e. the color of the clothes being worn by
>>voters, the personalities of the booth monitors, the amount of dust
>>on the switches, the name of the street each voting location is on, etc.
>>However, for a formal description of the process of voting, this is
>>not a factor.  Thus, for some X, one could model all of the relevant
>>properties of it (my assumption, modeling such items as listed above
>>is NOT necessary to completely model the voting process).

>Fair enough.  But the formal description is not fixed.  There were
>times in the past when such factors as race and sex would have been
>part of the formal description of elections.  They no longer are.
>The election case is relatively simple in the sense that there is a
>formal description encoded in election law.  But in general this is
>not the case, and there may be no objective choice of a formal
>description for a simulation.

Agreed.

>>>>I have a question:Would you say that human beings are merely an "embodiment"
>>>>of a pre-existing algorithm which defines them?  Or is it more accurate to
>>>>say that we can invent an algorithm to describe human beings (even assuming,
>>>>for the moment, there there is some algorithm which could be taken as
>>>>corresponding to human function).

>>>I would be closer to the second alternative. 

>>Of course, I would assume that because you have not struck me as a platonist.
>>Pushing the platonist stance to an extreme, one can interprete the 
>>universe as being a grounded symbol system, where every physical process
>>is an embodiment of of some objectively "existing" formal system.

>Some people do push it to this extreme.  But our usual definition of
>a formal system has some requirement of being finitely generated.  It
>is not certain that there could be a finitely generated formal
>description of the universe.

Okay, I'll go along with that (though, of course, there's no way of knowing,
either way).

>>I tend to take the opposite stance, that we invent formal descriptions
>>of processes.  But it is interesting to me to think what can happen when
>>pushing the platonic view to an extreme.  

>>Of course, it is also interesting to me that no matter which of the
>>extremes you take about the priority of formal descriptions, artifical
>>intelligence is in theory possible.  Two interpretations:

>>2) The physical universe is what it is and we invent different formal
>>   descriptions to approximate it.  Basically, every description we have
>>   of the world and every theory is a kind of curve-fitting, and we're
>>   trying to find the best curve.

>Yes, this is about how I look at it.

>>                               Thus, if intelligence is defined
>>   functionally (as opposed to "it needs to come from an organic brain")
>>   anything with the ability to be decsribed by the required functions
>>   is equally intelligent.

>Right.  That is essentially my position.

I would agree completely.  Hmmm.  We seem only to agree.  Does that mean this
thread ends?  Too bad, it was interesting while it lasted.

Greg Stevens

stevens@prodigal.psych.rochester.edu

