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From: pindor@gpu.utcc.utoronto.ca (Andrzej Pindor)
Subject: Re: Zeleny on predictability (was FIRST order?)
Message-ID: <DCnH4o.Cx8@gpu.utcc.utoronto.ca>
Organization: UTCC Public Access
References: <jqbDBu09v.G9H@netcom.com> <GUDEMAN.95Jul27195705@baskerville.cs.arizona.edu> <DCFyxI.62w@gpu.utcc.utoronto.ca> <GUDEMAN.95Jul30123932@baskerville.cs.arizona.edu>
Date: Tue, 1 Aug 1995 21:02:47 GMT
Lines: 395
Xref: glinda.oz.cs.cmu.edu comp.ai:32079 comp.ai.philosophy:31188 sci.logic:13432 sci.cognitive:8767

In article <GUDEMAN.95Jul30123932@baskerville.cs.arizona.edu>,
David Gudeman <gudeman@cs.arizona.edu> wrote:
>In article <DCFyxI.62w@gpu.utcc.utoronto.ca> pindor@gpu.utcc.utoronto.ca (Andrzej Pindor) writes:
>
>]In article <GUDEMAN.95Jul27195705@baskerville.cs.arizona.edu>,
>]David Gudeman <gudeman@cs.arizona.edu> wrote:
>]>In article <DCE209.LqL@gpu.utcc.utoronto.ca> pindor@gpu.utcc.utoronto.ca (Andrzej Pindor) writes:
>
>]>................Certainly it does not explain anything.  
>]
>]If this would not count as explanation, what would? I feel that (and you seem 
>]to have said this below) word "explain" has an empty domain for you.
>
>The word "explain" has several meanings.  One meaning is that a
>
Let's concentrate on meanings which are relevant.

>A third sense of the word is the sense that one can "explain" a class of
>events by providing a mathematical description and asserting that the
>mathematical relationships have some sort of universal character.  For
>example Newton's inverse square law of gravity was said to "explain"
>the motion of the planets and terrestrial ballistics.  I take it that
>this use is derivitive from the the second use; one can supposedly
>deduce physical events from the laws of physics in the way that one
>can deduce mathematical truths from the laws of mathematics.  But the 
>two uses are divergent, and when applied to physics the use is rather
>metaphysical.  After all, in order for this to count as an explanation
>in the mathematical sense, one must assume that the activities of the
>universe are like the activities of reasoning --that one event
>logically follows from another.  Regardless of how one evaluates the
>plausibility (or lack thereof) of this view of the universe, it is
>clearly metaphysical.
>
>A fourth sense of explanation, and the one that I think mechanists
>tend to rely on in their faith that everything can be explained
>mechanically, is the use in which one offers a theory about
>unobservable entities and a set of laws describing how the activities
>of the unobservables lead to the observable phenomenon.  Examples are
>the mechanical theory of heat and the wave theory of light.  This
>sense of the word is subject to the same criticism as the third sense,
>as well as two adidtional criticisms.
>
>First, when anyone other than a scientist talks about unobservable
>entities, the entities are not called "unobservable", they are called
>"occult", and the person rash enough to bring them up is accused of
>all sorts of heinous mental failings by scientists and scientist
>wannabees.  There is no logical (read that in the technical sense)
>reason to prefer one sort of occult entity over another.  And there is
>damned good empirical evidence (from the history of science) to
>suggest that the current scientific occult theories are only theories
>of the moment, and will not last more than a century or two.
>Therefore the scientific explanation of today can reasonably be
>expecteded to be a quaint curiosity tomorrow, and I see no reason to
>wait.
>
>An aside: scientists who are rash enough to mention unobservable
>entities that are not acceptable to current theory are treated even
>worse than outsiders.  This practice has all the earmarks of a
>religious organization defending the current orthodoxy, and is not at
>all what one would expect from a society dedicated to the expansion of
>knowledge.
>
>Second, as you agree yourself, when two theories explain the facts
>equally well, there is no reason to assume that one is more true than
>another.  For any explanatory theory containing occult entities, there
>is an infinite number of theories without those entities that have the
>same observable consequences.  By your own admission, all of these
>theories are equally true, so there is no reason to give special
>status to the one that you claim "explains" something.
>
In other words you are saying that "explanations" in the relevant to our 
discussion sense do not exist, right? But if so, why are asking for any
explanations? Either I am confused about what you are really after or you are
confused - you are asking for explanations of mental phenomena (in terms of
physical concepts) although you have just argued that "explanations" are not
possible. So what is it?
How about taking a pragmatic (as opposed to metaphysical) approach - something 
counts as an explanation if it can be used to make predictions which are 
confirmed by experimental observations?
For instance, Bohr's model explained Balmer's series, because the same model
predicted also other spectral lines (for instance Lyman's series) which were
susequently found experimentally, etc., etc.
Newton's inverse square law of gravity explains motion of planets, since 
predictions based on it are born out by experiments. Your comments which
followed are totally besides the point (sort of armchair mental gymnastics),
if you take a pragmaic view of what counts as an explanation.
The same applies to  your unflattering comments about scientists using "occult"
entities. The scientists may be talking about "unobservable entities", but as 
long as these entities are useful in making empirically verifiable predictions,
your contempt is unjustified. Such entities are "occult" if they are "in
principle" unobservable. You of course are exagerating about accusations of
"heinous mental failings", although I did not see a smiley.

>However, and I want to stess this, my rather unflattering ideas about
>scientific explanations are _not_ the reason for my claim that one
>cannot explain mental activities in terms of mechanical activities.

Your "unflattering ideas" make a notion of "explanation" totally empty.
I am suggesting that you should therefore abandon this notion and either stop
asking for explanations (which according to your notion of "explanation" are
impossible) or modify your notion of this term.

>Most of the scientific occult entities that have made their way into
>the accepted dogma have at least had the virtue that they had
>geometrical or other substantive connections from the explanatory
>agency to the thing that needed explaining.  Light waves followed the
>path that the perceptible light was assumed to follow.  Heat consists
>of the motion of molecules within the hot substance, and the effects
>of changing heat can be explained by the stasticial motion of the
>molecules.  I don't see the possibility for any such connection in the
>mechanical-to-mental reduction.
>
The "occult" quantities made their way into accepted dogma because they are
useful in making testable predictions.

>]>The perceptual facts are the cognitive events associated with heat.
>]>Saying that the molecules of a surface have a high kinetic energy does
>]>not explain why I feel warmth when I touch it.  Why could I not feel
>]>coldness instead?  Or vibration?  Or why could the touch of a warm
>]>surface not make me see green stars flashing before my eyes?  What is
>]>the causal connection between perceptual warmth and physical heat?
>]>You might say that you just can't answer this because science has not
>]>progressed that far.  I say that I cannot even imagine what would
>]>count as an answer.
>]>
>]Sorry, but I have problems understanding your questions. Are you asking
>]why do we see red as red and green as green and not green as red and red as 
>]green?
>]Isn't such a question completely meaningless?
>
>Maybe, but I'm not the one who is trying to explain cognitive phenomena.
>
Asking meaningless questions is not the same as trying to explain something,
in fact these two are orthogonal. In your case explanations are out of the 
question unless you modify your criteria for explanation.

>] You are presumably not surprised
>]that we have different perceptions for different stimuli, are you? How we
>]call them is totally irrelevant, isn't it?
>
>The words we use are irrelevant.  But it is an empirical fact that I
                                                ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
>feel a certain sensation under certain conditions.  This is a

No, it is not. What experiment can I do to know what sensations do you feel?

>cognitive fact, not a physical one, because I cannot show you my

Ah! So how can you expect physical explanations for non-physical facts?

>sensation, I can't give it a location or any other physical properties
>other than time.  If minds can be explained in terms of mechanical
>events, then one thing that must be explained is this particular
>empirical event --my perception of warmth.
>
As I said - physical explanations can only concern physical facts.

>] And don't you think that we could
>]find out that different stimuli lead to different processes (excitations,
>]transitions or like) in the brain? If this is not an explanation for you, can 
>]you suggest what possible _shape_ could the answer have? If you cannot, then
>]I do not see how the question can have any meaning as to "why".
>
>You are the one who is claiming that mental events are really just
>physical events (see disparaging comments below about "dualism").  It
>is not up to me to tell you how to show this, I claim that it cannot
>be done.  It is up to you to explain in exactly what sense we are to

You are right - you have formulated the problem in such a way that it can not
be done "by definition".

>understand that mental events are really just physical events.  I
>can't imagine any sense in which this is true other than the sense in
>which mental events are temporal and can interact termporally with
>physical events.
>
In my view the questions you pose (why do I see green as green etc) are
totally meaningless. If you disagree, please give me suggestion what could
possibly, just as a hypothetical example, count as an answer to the question
"why" in such a case. I just cannot see, so I claim that it is not a legitimate
use of the word "why".

>Let me try to be more specific.  I am familiar with a physical world.
>In this world are physical objects that have cerain sorts of
>properties.  Physical objects can be hard or soft; red, green or
>other-colored; loud or quiet.  Physical object have physical
>locations, places in space where they are at a given time (although
>the space may be highly extended).  I am also familiar with a mental
>world.  In the mental world are mental events with their own sorts of
>characteristics: believed or not believed, pleasant or unpleasant,
>about or not about something else.  These events and their properties
>are entirely different in quality from physical events and their
>properties.  Furthermore, the mental events are just as clear as, and
>more certain than, any physical events.
>
Yes, what you call "mental events" are different from physical events.
No, they are not as certain (and even less "more certain") than any physical
events. In case of physical events you can verify them by seeking a consent of
other people - if you cannot find such consent you conclude that you were
deluded. In case of mental events there is no way of such verification so 
there is no way to know if you are deluding yourself or not (there are known
cases of imagined, psychosomatic, pain etc).

>Now, my naive empirical view of the matter is that physical events are
>one sort of thing and mental events are another compeletely different
>sort of thing.  I have excelent empirical evidence for this position.
>Now if you are going to tell me that I am mistaken, that mental events
>are really just physical events, then it is up to you to explain how
>this is the case.  But you claim ignorance, you say that science has
>not progressed so far.  Well, I'm willing to be open-minded about it;
>if you have faith that science will one day vindicate your position,
>then all I'm going to ask for now is that you say how it might be
>possible, even in _principle_ that you are right.  Give me a clue, for
>I confess that I do not have one.  I see no hope whatsoever for
>science to do what you so confidently assert it can.
>
On upour definition of mental events, you are right - they are completely
different from physical events and in my view science has nothing to say
about such events.

>If you cannot do this, then I propose, without intending to offend,
>that yours is essentially a religious belief, tanamount to a faith in
>a metaphysical mystery.  You not only believe without seeing, but
>believe without even seeing a logical possibility.  As I said, I do
>not intend to offend by this remark, I do not even intend to
>criticize.  Your faith is your own affair, and you are most welcome to
>it.  However, I do criticize when someone tries to draw distinctions
>between his own faith and someone else's on the basis of SCIENCE.
>
See above.

>
>]>]>...  just
>]>]>because a particular model of the mind is esthetic, well-organized,
>]>]>and capable of useful predictions, that does not mean the model is any
>]>]>truer than any other model capable of making a similar class of
>]>]>predictions.
>]>
>]>...  The point is that one theory
>]>is _not_ less true than another, implying that they are both equally
>]>true (or both equally false).
>]>
>]As long as both theories explain all known relevant facts, I agree with you.
>]The choice between them is then a matter of pragmatics...
>
>]If you invoke "non-physical" events, you are rise a spectre of dualism. For
>]me dualism is a literature rather then science, and a bad literature at that.
>]In this forum I am prepared to discuss science only.
>
>There are several comments to make to this.  First, I'm not sure what
>you mean by "dualism", but if you are referring to the position that
>mental phenomena cannot be explained in terms of physical phenomena,
>then this position has much stronger empirical and logical support
>than yours does --at least until you can produce an explanation of how
>in prinicple a mental event can be explained as a physical event.
>
What I mean by "dualism" is a position that there exist non-physical events
which can influence physical ones. If you claim that your "mental events"
(which clearly are not physical) have such a property, please give evidence.

>Second, I don't know what literature you are talking about.  If you
>will list some of the authors you have read on this issue I might be
>able to explicate them.
>
In another place I referred to Harlequin novels, but really I do not have any
wish to go into this.

>Third, by your own admission above, if two theories are equally good
>at explaining empirical results, then they are both equally true.
>This position is not consistent with your apparently apriori rejection
>of dualistic theories.
>
Why? I do not see any contradiction, if you consider this theories 
pragamtically, as models useful in making testable predictions. 

>]>Frankly, it is obvious (a posteriori) that there are patterns, not
>]>only in the physical universe, but in animal and human behavior as
>]>well.  It is equally obvious that the better one knows these patterns,
>]
>]I find the above distinction surprising - animal and human behavior is 
>]a part of physical universe for me.
>
>The word "physical" has several meanings.  In particular, while it can
>refer to any spatio-temporal event, it also can refer specifically to
>events not associated with life.  I caution you not to read to much
>into incidental word choices.
>
Caution noted.

>]>the better one can predict events, or even mimic them.  But if one
>]>gives a description of the patterns by way of a theory that contains
>]>references to unobservable entities and events, this is no reason at
>]>all to suppose that the occult entities and events exist.
>]>
>]If these "unobservable entities and events" are unobservable "in principle"
>]then such a description is not a scientific one (rather what I'd call a 'bad
>]literature'). And you are right, saying that these exist is an unwarranted use
>]of the word "exist" (as by Wittgenstein).
>
>You have just suggested that the theory of electrons is bad literature
>instead of science.  (And I was not making a Wittgensteinian remark.)
>
Really? How?  Are you claiming that electrons are unobservable "in principle"?

...........
>]And I can plausibly say
>]that for this "ball" on the computer screen the space in which it 'lives'
>]IS an array of cells. The problem arises only if you start mixing space of
>]a real ping-pong ball with the space of the 'ball' pattern on the screen.
>
>I think you have missed the point of the example.  What happens on the
>computer is irrelevant, I only mentioned the computer as a motivation
>for the particular representation I chose.  The point is that I can
>represent space using ficticious entities, and that I can get accurate
>predictions of real (not computer) events using this representation.
>But this is not evidence that the ficticious entities in my
>representation are real.  I'm just talking about the model here, not
>the implemented program.
>
You are using a limited model to predict a limited range of events, so what?
I think you are ascribing me the view which I do not hold.

>]>]If so, then what is the point of debating any science question?
>]>
>]>Well, there still plenty of work to do once you give up explanations.
>]
>]What might this be? Could you give an example? Would this 'work' be equivalent
>]to doing 'science'?
>
>There are are three aspects to science: empirical investigation,
>modeling the results of empirical investigation (by mathematical laws,
>for example), and inventing metaphysial explanations.  I only propose
>dropping the third line of investigation.  As motivation for this
>proposal, I not only can give epistemological reasons, but pragmatic
>ones as well.  Historically, the empirical and modeling parts of
>science have had great successes and little controversy, leading to
>the only progress that is apparent in science.  By contrast, the
>metaphysical explanations, from Galileo and Descartes to the modern QM
>controversies, have lead to little more than empty argument with
>frequent turnover in metaphysical dogmas.  If there is any progressive
>trend in this part of science, it is hard to pin down.
>
What do you mean by "dropping metaphysical explanations"? Please give an
example. Prehaps, contrary to what you think, our views may not be so far
apart, except that you do not take into account pragmatic aspects of physical
theories.

>]>But on the other hand, much scientific work of the past and present
>]>would then come to seem pretty pointless.
>]>
>]I do not understand what you mean by this. Had it not been for this
>]scientific work of the past and present you migh be living in a cave
>]and communicating with others by voice and body language and not by
>]Internet, for instance.
>
>This is only true if you subsume all technological advance into
>"science".  But the enormous majority of technological advances took
>place with nothing resembling the scholarly trappings of science.
>
You seem to have this resentment of "the scholarly trappings of science".
Science is not defiend by "the scholarly trappings".

>]I assume you are speaking for yourself :-). How about "if you don't have what
>]you like, you like what you have"? "Science" is what people do to be more
>]effective in dealing with the nature, where does anything mythical come in?
>
>Is that what science is?  Then most of what goes on in scientific
>research facilities is not science.
>
No? What establishments are you talking about? Perhaps youy confuse what 
scientists talk about in their free time with what they do.

.....................
>
>]>Gee, I didn't start out to get that depressing...
>]
>]Try to like what you have instead of regretting what you don't :-).
>
>I don't regret anything about science.  If it were done properly I
>wouldn't have anything to complain about, and what fun would that be?

"Properly"? What would it be?

>--
>					David Gudeman
>gudeman@cs.arizona.edu

Andrzej
PS. I am leaving for 10 days. If you want me to read your answer, please email
it to me.
-- 
Andrzej Pindor                        The foolish reject what they see and 
University of Toronto                 not what they think; the wise reject
Instructional and Research Computing  what they think and not what they see.
pindor@gpu.utcc.utoronto.ca                           Huang Po
