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From: lady@uhunix3.its.Hawaii.Edu (Lee Lady)
Subject: Re: On What Is Said (and WHO says it)....
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Summary: Language can be a causative factor for behavior.  
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References: <806569461snz@longley.demon.co.uk> <DCG6Fv.43@news.hawaii.edu> <807003578snz@longley.demon.co.uk>
Date: Sat, 29 Jul 1995 08:26:34 GMT
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Xref: glinda.oz.cs.cmu.edu sci.psychology:45044 comp.ai.philosophy:31071 sci.logic:13288 sci.cognitive:8677

In article <807003578snz@longley.demon.co.uk> David@longley.demon.co.uk writes:
>In article <DCG6Fv.43@news.hawaii.edu>
>           lady@uhunix.its.Hawaii.Edu "Lee Lady" writes:
>      >SNIP<
>      >SNIP<
>> The importance of language lies in the fact that it has meaning, and
>> one can't learn much without considering that meaning.  And as soon as

If I'd been writing more carefully, I would have said, "The importance of
language is that it means something," in order to avoid using the
abstract noun --- meaning --- and subsequent arguments about whether
there is some entity corresponding to this noun.  

And yet even the rephrasing doesn't completely avoid the problem.  When I
saw that language "means something," then there is a temptation to ask
for a referent for that pronoun and ask, "What, then, is that
*something* which a sentence means?"

This problem arises only when one is talking on the level of
philosophical generality.  Applied to particular examples, the linguistic
pattern does not cause any problem.  

For instance, Longley refers an example given by me as follows:  

>> information presented in the form of language.  Why don't I put more salt
>> on my food, for instance?  Not because I get any obvious reinforcement
>> for avoiding salt.  But because I have been *told* and have *read* that
>> using less salt will be better for my health, and now I have a *belief*
>> that this is the case, even though I have no personal or even vicarious
>> evidence from direct experience supporting my belief.  
>> 
>
>If  we  acknowledge the problems of the intensional,  (which  are 
>clearly  illustrated by the 'said that' *example*, and one  seeks 
>explicit  measures  in order to maintain  consistency  and  allow 
>inference, I put it to you that we have no choice but to work  on 
>behaviour.  There  *is*, in the  language  quantification  theory 
>(FOL), nothing else (cf. Quine on the value of variables).

Here I say, in all honesty, "What is the meaning of this?" or "What does
this mean?"  I think there is no linguistic objection to these questions,
no temptation to believe that my first question presupposes some sort of
entity called "meaning."  Instead, Longley will understand exactly what
my questions mean and will (I hope) reply by giving additional
explication.  (Of course, being David Longley, he might just quote some
Quine or Skinner at me, leaving me as mystified as ever. :-)    )


I want to amplify my statement that one of the most important
considerations in human psychology is the fact that information given in
the form of language can cause behavior.  Since I haven't read Skinner's
work on language, I don't know to what extent he addresses this, but I
don't think that this causative impact of language can be fit into a
stimulus-response paradigm.   A dog, or many other animals, can be
trained to respond in a given way to a specific word.  For the dog, the
word is essentially just a collection of sounds, simply a sensory
stimulus.  But for human beings, it is clear that a lot of processing
goes on and the response is caused by more than a particular pattern of
sounds. 

For instance, many people will respond fairly neutrally to the
statement, "A bug often crawls faster than a turtle," but will have a
notably different response to the statement, "There's a bug about to
crawl up your leg," and still a different response to the statement,
"There's a bug about to crawl up *my* leg."

It seems that when a person hears a description in language of a fairly
concrete situation, the brain creates a sensory representation of the
experience described, and the person responds in a way somewhat similar
to the response they would have if these same images were received
through the sense organs.  The response can be quite emotional and
sometimes even physiological, causing the listener to break out in a
sweat or become nauseous, especially when certain sorts of things are
described while a person is eating.  

Now, if language heard from another person can be a causative factor in
behavior, what about language the subject himself generates, talking to
himself either internally or out loud.  It would seem farfetched to
simply reject out of hand the possibility that the things that a person
says to himself can be causative for behavior.  And, in fact, this is
commonly accepted to be the case, except by a few psychologists.

Also, the influence of something said to a person can manifest itself
days, or even years, in the future.  Which is simply to say that the
things a person knows can help determine behavior.  Knowledge is often
a causative factor in behavior.

But then how can we claim that beliefs cannot be a causative factor in
behavior?  Because there's only a fine shade of difference between
believing something and knowing something.  

--
If a kid asks where rain comes from, 
I think a cute thing to tell him is, "God is crying."  
And if he asks why God is crying, another cute thing to tell him is, 
"Probably because of something you did."   --- Jack Handey
