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From: lady@uhunix.its.Hawaii.Edu (Lee Lady)
Subject: Re: On What Is Said (and WHO says it)....
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Summary: Direct quotation is not adequate.  
Keywords: meaning    optical illusions
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Organization: University of Hawaii (Mathematics Dept)
References: <806569461snz@longley.demon.co.uk>
Date: Fri, 28 Jul 1995 22:28:43 GMT
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Xref: glinda.oz.cs.cmu.edu sci.psychology:45030 comp.ai.philosophy:31043 sci.logic:13277 sci.cognitive:8656

In his rather extensive sequence of articles with various subject
headers, David Longley has been arguing, among other things, that a
scientific approach to psychology cannot be based on concepts such as
beliefs, knowledge (at least as applies to an individual's personal
knowledge), thoughts and the like.  The reason for this is that not only
are such "mentalist" entities not directly observable, but they are not
even precisely and accurately specifiable.  In other words, when we
want to identify a person's belief, we might say something like "John
believes that X."  In saying this, X  is almost always a paraphrase or
summary, a description that has not been verbatim recorded from the
subject's observable statements and behavior.  But this means that
different observers will usually come up with slightly different versions
of  X.  And the problem gets worse, because if we consider two subjects
with "the same" belief  X, more detailed examination will reveal that  X
doesn't actually mean the same for John as it does for George, say.  So
how can we have a scientific discussion when we can't even accurately
and specifically identify the things under discussion?  

This problem does not arise, according to Quine, whom Longley amply
quotes, when we confine our discussion to actual statements made by
subjects.  Such statements can be accurately transcribed verbatim, as
if one were to treat statements simply as meaningless sequences of
sounds, in the same way that one might transcribe a bird call.  The
result will be independent of the observer, barring conceivable
disagreement over spelling (the problem of homonyms).

(Actually, mere verbatim transcription ignores the important of
intonation and facial expression.  A change of intonation can
drastically effect the meaning of a sentence, and a facial expression
can completely reverse the meaning.  I myself rely on facial expression
heavily, otherwise my habit of teasing people, including strangers,
would often get me beat up.  On usenet, one resorts to the "smiley" as
a partial substitute for facial expression and omission of the smiley
can result in serious misunderstandings.)

(Furthermore, meaning is often extremely contextual.  A statement made by
John may not mean the same thing as the same statement made by George.
And it may not mean at all the same thing as the same statement made by
John in a different situation or the context of a different discussion.
So in order to get useful information, one may need not only John's words
but various personal information about John and about the context in
which the statement was made.  Verbatim transcription becomes a
formidible task!)  


Now in the beginning of this article, I have *paraphrased* Longley, and
I am sure that he will correct me to the extent that my paraphrase is
inaccurate.

I think that my paraphrasing here provides a good example of the fallacy
of believing that direct quotation completely avoids the problems involved
in talking about "internal" content, such as thoughts and beliefs.  
Because of his extremely obscure style of presentation, David Longley
provides an excellent example of a case where one can't discuss his ideas
intelligently on the basis of merely quoting what he says directly (as
one usually does in usenet discussions) but is forced to resort to
paraphrase.  

The importance of language lies in the fact that it has meaning, and
one can't learn much without considering that meaning.  And as soon as
we talk about meaning we fail to avoid the dangers of paraphrase.  Yes,
it would be much cleaner, much safer to treat language simply as
behavior, simply as the production of sounds.  But if one plays it safe
in this way, then one is unable to discuss many of the most interesting
aspects of human behavior.

Also, by trying to avoid the concept of meaning, one is unable to
scientifically address one of the most important factors in human
psychology, namely the extent to which behavior can be caused by
information presented in the form of language.  Why don't I put more salt
on my food, for instance?  Not because I get any obvious reinforcement
for avoiding salt.  But because I have been *told* and have *read* that
using less salt will be better for my health, and now I have a *belief*
that this is the case, even though I have no personal or even vicarious
evidence from direct experience supporting my belief.  


I don't want to get into this argument much, because I have too much to
say and it takes too long and I have more important things I want to
devote my life to.  What I am going to do, though, is to repost to
sci.psychology a series of articles I wrote a few years ago when there
was another discussion in on the topic of meaning.

To end this article, though, I would like to point of that those who
claim that a scientific approach to psychology should never consider
internal states and behaviors but only objectively observable behavior
might consider one of the areas of psychology almost universal
respected as being scientific, even by those in the physical sciences.
This is the very oldest branch of cognitive psychology and, in fact, of
psychology in general.  Namely, the study of perception. 

Although it is certainly in principle feasible to study perception
using only the language of external behavior ("When subjects are shown
the following drawing, they report that the lines in the bottom figure
are longer than the ones in the top one"), this seems rather contrived
and not useful.  It might seem that one's perception of an optical
illusion is "private" and not objectively observable by others.  And yet
these perceptions are predictable and replicable and there is no problem
in studying them scientifically.  

--
If a kid asks where rain comes from, 
I think a cute thing to tell him is, "God is crying."  
And if he asks why God is crying, another cute thing to tell him is, 
"Probably because of something you did."   --- Jack Handey
