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From: stevens@prodigal.psych.rochester.edu (Greg Stevens)
Subject: Re: Is CONSCIOUSNESS continuous? discrete? quantized?
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References: <departedD3vKy5.M3B@netcom.com> <1995Feb24.152139.3684@galileo.cc.rochester.edu> <kovskyD4J82u.2vI@netcom.com> <1995Feb25.180325.3029@galileo.cc.rochester.edu> <kovskyD4L7An.pn@netcom.com>
Date: Sun, 26 Feb 95 21:38:56 GMT
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In <kovskyD4L7An.pn@netcom.com> kovsky@netcom.com (Bob Kovsky) writes:
>In the previous article, Greg Stevens wrote:

>Position A:

>>Yet I can disagree with symbolic representationalism (as in fact I do)
>>and still believe that behaviors can be accounted for by a matrix of
>>observed responses-to-inputs.  That is, although I believe that we
>>consist of a mechanism that is adaptive rather than representing,
>>any adapting system can be INTERPRETED and talked about AS IF it were
>>representing.

>>If we built something which merely correlated inputs with outputs, I do
>>not think it would be mimicking the PROCESS of how people work, but it
>>would be a difference process giving rise to the same OBSERVABLES.
>>This was my original point -- you could theoretically have consciousness-
>>like-activity arising from a process other-than-ours which is potentially
>>not-conscious.

>Position B:

>>Based on your representation of their theories, I agree with them 
>>completely.  But now we are discussing the actual processes giving
>>rise to our behaviors, and the structures of those processes.  I
>>was saying originally that something using DIFFERENT processes could
>>come up with the same observable behaviors (such as an arbitrarily
>>large T-machine) but may not be consciouss.  Therefore, 
>>although consciousness implied conscious activity, conscious activity
>>does not imply consciousness, and so therefore there seems to be
>>very little causal role for consciousness in function.  That is,
>>it seems epiphenomenal and without advantage, behaviorally or
>>evolutionarily.

>	I believe Position A implies Position B.  (Human intelligence is
>mechanistic implies that consciousness is not advantageous.) My observed
>reality is that consciousness is advantageous.  Hence I conclude that
>Position A is false. 

What in your observed reality leads you to believe that consciousness is
advantageous?  I'd think that any such belief was the result of sloppy
thinking and not-careful analysis, so I am curious about what leads
you to believe that consciousness is advantageous.  What about your
"observed reality" makes it seem so?

Greg Stevens

stevens@prodigal.psych.rochester.edu

