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From: jeff@aiai.ed.ac.uk (Jeff Dalton)
Subject: Re: Strong AI and consciousness
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References: <Czzp43.2x7@gpu.utcc.utoronto.ca> <D01oB1.JG8@cogsci.ed.ac.uk> <D03qpH.7C9@gpu.utcc.utoronto.ca>
Date: Fri, 2 Dec 1994 19:35:01 GMT
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In article <D03qpH.7C9@gpu.utcc.utoronto.ca> pindor@gpu.utcc.utoronto.ca (Andrzej Pindor) writes:
>In article <D01oB1.JG8@cogsci.ed.ac.uk>,
>Jeff Dalton <jeff@aiai.ed.ac.uk> wrote:
>>In article <Czzp43.2x7@gpu.utcc.utoronto.ca> pindor@gpu.utcc.utoronto.ca (Andrzej Pindor) writes:
>>>In article <Czu580.2Fv@cogsci.ed.ac.uk>,
>>>Jeff Dalton <jeff@aiai.ed.ac.uk> wrote:
>>>>I don't understand why people have so much difficulty with that
>>>>"Platonic" view.  Calling it Platonic seems a bit prejudicial to
>>>>me; I prefer "realism" (a common term for it in philosophy).
>>>>It's similar to realism about the physical world: e.g. that stars,
>>>>etc existed before there was anyone around to observe them.
>>>>
>>>I think that using the word "realism" is prejudical, because it implies that
>>>they are real, which is debatable.
>>
>>All it implies is that something is the case, not that there are
>>any extra entities or substances.
>>
>But is it the case? Like in our discussion about "gold" - it just is not 
>the case that in a distant past people always meant the same thing by "gold"
>as they do now.

That may be so (about gold), and I've never claimed otherwise.

>>> Why is "Platonic" prejudical?
>>
>>Because it brings in Plato's world of ideal forms, which is not
>>any part of realism about mental properties.
>>
>If you stick to your position about "gold", then you must be referring to 
>some "ideal" of gold which has properties about we even now do not know.

Not so.  I am referring to the stuff we call gold, which may well
have some properties we have not yet discovered.  Strange, isn't
it, that our definitions might not already tell us everything?  :->

>BTW, which isotope of gold are you referring to?

It was my assumption that the English word "gold" referred to all
of them.  If that's not the case, I'll be glad to stand corrected.

>>Nonehteless, Napoleon did either eat an egg or not for breakfast
>>that day (counting not hvaing breakfast on the didn't eat an egg
>>for breakfast side).  That's all I mean by saying there's a fact.
>>If Wittgenstein's an anti-realist about the past, then I'd say
>>he's wrong.
>>
>The point is that there is no way to know it, i.e. it does not make any 
>difference. 

I picked that example as something we couldn't know (at least not
in practice, with in-principle perhaps still to be discussed), so
I'm not going to argue that there is a way to know.

>Discussing it makes as much sense as counting angels on a pin head.

I certainly don't see the point in arguing about it.  Indeed,
who cares what Napoleon ate on most days?  But breakfast foods
are nice, ordinary, objects in the world.  Angels are a rather
different case.

>Classifying it as "a matter of fact" is misuse of the term, since it puts it
>on par with real "matters of fact", about which we can have evidence.

But nothing in realism stops you from distinguishing cases where we
can tell from those where we can't.

>It obscures the fact that our knowledge of the world comes from interacting
>with it and ultimately only this interaction counts.

And I'd say your approach obscures various facts.

>Well it loos then that I am espousing verificationism. What in your opinion
>gives meaning to statements, which cannot be verified?

In part, the meanings of the words involved.  "Napoleon ate an egg
that day" is meaningful.  But if you say otherwise, then fine, we're
just going to disagree and there may be no point in further discussion.

>>>Because it is more 'economical' - it does not require claiming existance of
>>>things which are not necessary.
>>
>>Why is it more economical?  I'm not sure what you're getting at
>>here.
>>
>'Economica' meaning it uses only minimum of resources. If you have two points
>to show you a trend, lacking any other evidence you would run a straight line
>though them, since only two parameters can be uniquely determined with two
>points, right? Even though you could run an infinity of other lines, with all
>sorts of parameters, values of which you would have to take out of thin air,
>or use your emotional preferences (biases).

And so...?  How does this tell agains realism about Napoleon's egg?

>>I mean that in some cases where Occam's razor would pick A over B
>>we nonetheless pick B and regard that as correct.
>>
>Occam's razer is a criterion of last resort, I've though it was clear to
>everyone. We use it to make a choice, when no other criteria are available. 

The actual use often seems to be as a stick to beat people who don't
follow a sufficiently "scientific" (often verificationish) line, which
may make a number of things not always clear to everyone, I fear.

>Please give an example when we choose a more complicated explanation,
>over a simpler one, with no evidence favouring the complicated one.

I gave an example: physical objects.  You can criticize that example
if you want.

>Well, some poeple do it on idelogical grounds, but this is not science.

That "not science" is inferior is also ideological.  

>>>And the point is that if mental states are
>>>physical states of a physical brain system. If they are, then there should
>>>be an "objective" (independent of the brain having them) way of establishing
>>>it. If this cannot be done, then Occam's razor cuts them off - they are not
>>>necessary to explain functioning of the brain.
>>
>>I think I actually agree with that.
>>
>I am relieved, honestly.

Glad to hear it.

-- jeff
