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From: pindor@gpu.utcc.utoronto.ca (Andrzej Pindor)
Subject: Re: Strong AI and consciousness
Message-ID: <Czzp43.2x7@gpu.utcc.utoronto.ca>
Organization: UTCC Public Access
References: <3aukr2$t3h@mp.cs.niu.edu> <1994Nov23.184324.27664@oxvaxd> <CzsIwC.DFv@gpu.utcc.utoronto.ca> <Czu580.2Fv@cogsci.ed.ac.uk>
Date: Mon, 28 Nov 1994 18:09:38 GMT
Lines: 83

In article <Czu580.2Fv@cogsci.ed.ac.uk>,
Jeff Dalton <jeff@aiai.ed.ac.uk> wrote:
>I don't understand why people have so much difficulty with that
>"Platonic" view.  Calling it Platonic seems a bit prejudicial to
>me; I prefer "realism" (a common term for it in philosophy).
>It's similar to realism about the physical world: e.g. that stars,
>etc existed before there was anyone around to observe them.
>
I think that using the word "realism" is prejudical, because it implies that
they are real, which is debatable. Why is "Platonic" prejudical?

>Certainly the idea that something might be the case even though
>I can't tell doesn't bother me; moreover, there must be many things
>of that sort.  E.g. did Napoleon have an egg for breakfast 3 days
>after his 7th birthday?  (I'm trying to pick something that won't
>be in any records -- substitute a different example if there's one
>you prefer.)
>
If you allow that the above fact is not in any records, then there is no way
to establish it and then it does not make sense for me to discuss if this
was a case or not. Claiming that it is a "matter of fact" what he had for
breakfast on that day even if it cannot be possibly established comes down to
misuse of words, very much as argued by Wittgenstein.

>>or whether there have to be (at least in principle) a method for others to
>>determine unambigously if x is conscious for the question of conciousness to 
>>make an objective sense. It seems that you take the former stance whereas 
>>Neil Rickert takes the latter and observes that no such method seems available
>>(and I agree with him).
>
>The idea of methods "in principle" is rather tricky in itself.
>Could I in principle know the truth about Napoleon's egg?  Is
>time travel acceptable?  If so, I'm not sure why mental states
>are wupposed to be less accessible.  Or what about historical 
>records.  If having someone tell me is succifient, then perhaps
>it's sufficient for mental states as well.  Anyway, I'm not
>sure how we should determine what's allowed in principle.
>
Yes, it can be tricky.

>BTW, your view sounds like verificationist to me.  Perhaps
>we can at least determine whether it is verificationist.  
>
I am not sure of an exact definition of a verificationism. It might be 
(hopefully you do not mean it as a term of abuse).
........
>>I do not think there is a unique way of deciding between these two 
>>philosophical positions, except perhaps Occam's razor which favors the second
>>one.
>
>Why do you say Occam's razor favors it?  I could see Occam's razor

Because it is more 'economical' - it does not require claiming existance of
things which are not necessary.

>working against, say, physical objects, if we could explain our
>experience without bringing them in.  But we still ordinarily allow

I do not understand - how can some objects be physical if our experience 
does not in some sense interact with them? What is your definition of
"physical"?

>that physical objects exist.  So if Occam's razor isn't always a
>decisive factor, why would it be so effective when it came to
>realism about mental states (which doesn't, after all, involve
>any extra entities per se).

Again I do not understand. What do you mean by: "So if Occam's razor isn't 
always a decisive factor" ? And the point is that if mental states are
physical states of a physical brain system. If they are, then there should
be an "objective" (independent of the brain having them) way of establishing
it. If this cannot be done, then Occam's razor cuts them off - they are not
necessary to explain functioning of the brain.

>
>-- jeff
>
Andrzej
-- 
Andrzej Pindor                        The foolish reject what they see and 
University of Toronto                 not what they think; the wise reject
Instructional and Research Computing  what they think and not what they see.
pindor@gpu.utcc.utoronto.ca                           Huang Po
