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From: stevens@prodigal.psych.rochester.edu (Greg Stevens)
Subject: Re: Randomness is a human concept (was Re: Time is a human concept)
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Date: Sat, 5 Nov 94 21:46:05 GMT
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<39gpcl$fea@news.acns.nwu.edu> jed@nam.earth.nwu.edu (John DeLaughter) writes:
> stevens@prodigal.psych.rochester.edu (Greg Stevens) writes:
>>In <39ehll$fmo@news.acns.nwu.edu> jed@nam.earth.nwu.edu writes:
>>> stevens@prodigal.psych.rochester.edu (Greg Stevens) writes:

[much deleted] 
>>Science make implicit statements about "truth" when it even
>>makes the ontological separation between observer and observed, rather than
>>embracing the circularity implicit in all research about the world in which 
>>we ourselves exist.  In philosophy of science, it is commonly held that
>>a theory which ascribes many observed variables to underlying variables,
>>rather than simply finding correlations between observed variables, is
>>better -- this implies more than just testable predictions, and more than
>>just interaction, it implies independant underlying structure.

>A theory which does more than just describe the known variables in preferred
>because it extends our understanding of the mechanisms of the universe -
>even if that theory is shown to be false.  (Because, then we at least know
>that the universe doesn't work in that way.)  But, please note that, again,
>we test thoeries based on the correctness of their predictions, not the
>truth of the underlying `reality'.

First you say that theories incorporating hidden variables "extend out
understanding OF THE MECHANISMS OF THE UNIVERSE" [emphasis mine], then
you say that we test our theories based on predictions RATHER THAN
underlying 'reality.'  How can you speak of "mechanisms of the universe"
when everything about theory-testing is in a relative framework of our
observation?  Aren't you instead talking about mechanisms of our perception,
in which case we get back to the original point: 1) theories with theoretical
values (non-obnservational) contain nothing of interest and 2) there
is a fundamental circularity between observer and observed which must be
addressed whenever we speak of pattern, where that pattern lies in OUR
perception rather than in the, as you say, "mechanisms of the universe."

>>Too frequently the underlying structure that is discovered is ascribed ONLY
>>to the "outside world" rather than our participation in the measurements.

>When a scientist ascribes the behaviour of a photon to Maxwell's laws, he
>does so because those laws are the simplest set of descriptive terms.  In
>a case such as this, including human participation makes the theory more
>complex and less likely to be correct.

Certainly including human participation makes the theory more
complex, but less likely to be correct?  Denying the one fact which our
measurement undeniably attains -- the fact of our participation in 
an act of measurement -- makes the theory less likely to be correct?
It seems to me that any theory which denies the tautological statement
that "Amongst the data collected in the collecting of data is the data of
the fact that we have collected data" CAN NOT be correct.

>>I guess I honestly believe that the world IS a much stranger place than
>>your perception of it seems to make it.  I wasn't making claims about
>>the macrological application of Heissenberg's principle in particular,
>>but rather the concept of observer-interaction.

>I quote: "That is why Heisenberg's work was such a blow, and yet on the
>macroscopic scale of things, the concept is often ignored... it makes
>no sense whatsoever to talk about measurements we can make of the world 
>EXTERIOR to us..." Recognise those words?  They're yours, and they DO
>seem to state that you believe that the observer-observed interaction
>is applicable on a macroscopic scale.  

The observer-observed interaction, YES.  The particular parameters of
H.'s principle, no. 

>In the physical sciences, this
>is just not true.  In the sciences of biology, anthropology and their
>various relatives, the observer and observed do interact, but NOT because
>of quantum mechanics.

First, the interactions of which you speak in bio, anthro, etc. are what I
was talking about above, when I said, and I quote, "I wasn't making claims
about the macrological application of H.'s principle in particular, but rather
the concept of observer-interaction."  However, I would have to extend this
and say that I beleive it is ALSO applicable in the physical sciences, and
even in Math.

One's attitudes and ideological background, for example, influence ALL
sciences more than, I think, some scientists want to admit.  Take for 
example in logic, one of the most "objective" of sciences (or formal
studies anyway).  Spencer Brown has presented a system that is homeomorphic
to first order predicate calculus but relies on fewer premises.  It is
not widely accepted, though one would think such a sytem would make a big
splash.  Why hasn't it?  Because he frames his presentation of it 
ideologically, saying that his approach for first order predicate calc.
springs more from Eastern thought than the much more dualist Western
dogma on which current first order pred. calc. is based.  People have
a hard time understanding Brown's work, but it is coherant.  Different
ideological background.  


>>Though the particular
>>effect to which H. refers may cancel, other factors in the ascription of
>>properties to the "outside universe" are deeply entrenched in *our* 
>>participation in the observation process.  If we had radically different
>>structures ourselves, our measurements of the "structure" of the 
>>"outside universe" would undoubtedly be different because we would have
>>different perceptions, based around different salient organiztional
>>principles, to begin with.

>Can you give some examples of these `different salient organizational
>principles" as measures?  Somehow, I doubt it.  What we might have are
>different methods of organising the data collected, but the data itself
>would probably be measured in an equivalent manner.

You only believe that because the only people you have conversed with
have a very similar biological structure to yours.  Same with me.  :-)
My point, however, is that you need to recognize that our biology plays a
large ACTIVE role in the organization of our perceptions, and thus it is
necessarily true that something with a different biological structure would
have different perceptions.  This, surely, you can not deny.

Greg Stevens

stevens@prodigal.psych.rochester.edu

