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From: stevens@prodigal.psych.rochester.edu (Greg Stevens)
Subject: Re: Randomness is a human concept (was Re: Time is a human concept)
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Date: Sat, 5 Nov 94 06:49:02 GMT
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In <39ehll$fmo@news.acns.nwu.edu> jed@nam.earth.nwu.edu writes:
> stevens@prodigal.psych.rochester.edu (Greg Stevens) writes:

>>Implicit in these arguments is the notion that we as observers can somehow
>>set outselves external to the world we are studying and gain priviledged
>>objective access to understanding what these metaphysical rules are.  It
>>is a manifestation of the typical dualism between object and observer
>>which simply ISN'T, metaphysically (to use a term meaten to death in this
>>group), the case.
>>
>>A lot of science holds that we can find objective metaphysical truths 
>>about the universe because we can measure the world without effecting
>>it.  That is why Heissenberg's work was such a blow, and yet on the
>>macrological scale of things, the concept is often ignored -- we exist
>>within the medium of reality and it makes no sense whatsoever to talk
>>about measurements we can make of the world EXTERIOR to us -- we play a
>>vital rold in all observation.

>Two points, Greg.  First, science holds that we can find objective models
>which make testable predictions of reality.  Science sez bupkiss about
>`truth', unless you mean the quark.  Scientists want to model reality
>so that we can more effectively and appropriately interact with the universe;
>note that this means that we measure our models by correctness, not by truth.

Yet even in the terminology there is little distinction -- if all we wanted
to do was acknowledge patterns to enhance our effectiveness in interacting
with the universe, we could equally talk about "consistency" internal to
theoretical domains, rather than "correctness" -- unless you are using a
particular application of this term with which I may very well not be
familiar.  Scientists tend, in their language, to make statements about
"truth," which is why the materialists get in such a cafuffle when the
constructivists tell them that they play an active role in theoretical
inquiry.  Science make implicit statements about "truth" when it even
makes the ontological separation between observer and observed, rather than
embracing the circularity implicit in all research about the world in which 
we ourselves exist.  In philosophy of science, it is commonly held that
a theory which ascribes many observed variables to underlying variables,
rather than simply finding correlations between observed variables, is
better -- this implies more than just testable predictions, and more than
just interaction, it implies independant underlying structure.  Too 
frequently the underlying structure that is discovered is ascribed ONLY
to the "outside world" rather than our participation in the measurements.

>Second, Heisenberg's principle (and damn near all of quantum mechanics) is
>virtually always misunderstood by those who haven't got the math to play
>with the concepts.  While it is true that Heisenberg's principle says that
>the observer interacts with the observed on a *quantum scale* (i.e., a few
>atoms at a time), on a *macroscopic scale* those interactions cancel each
>other out for NO net interaction.  (Except for a very few, very odd cases
>such as liquid helium... 8->) This is precisely why we can derive 
>measurements which are exterior to ourselves.  If we could not, the
>world would be a much stranger place!

I guess I honestly believe that the world IS a much stranger place than
your perception of it seems to make it.  I wasn't making claims about
the macrological application of Heissenberg's principle in particular,
but rather the concept of observer-interaction.  Though the particular
effect to which H. refers may cancel, other factors in the ascription of
properties to the "outside universe" are deeply entrenched in *our* 
participation in the observation process.  If we had radically different
structures ourselves, our measurements of the "structure" of the 
"outside universe" would undoubtedly be different because we would have
different perceptions, based around different salient organiztional
principles, to begin with.

Greg Stevens

stevens@prodigal.psych.rochester.edu

