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From: tmaletic@phil.indiana.edu (Tim Maletic)
Subject: Re: Is Common Sense Explicit or Implicit?
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Date: Tue, 13 Sep 1994 13:47:56 GMT
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In article <34qanf$qvt@mp.cs.niu.edu>, rickert@cs.niu.edu (Neil Rickert) writes:
|> But here now is an interesting point.  Our learning is not an all or
|> nothing affair.  However it is quite clear that beliefs are
|> all-or-nothing.  You either have a belief, or you don't.

A number of people have responded to this claim, but I think it merits further
consideration.  There seem to be lots of assumptions packed into this simple
sounding claim (many of them, I hope, related to the explicit/implicit question).

How could we deny that "you either have a belief, or you don't"?  Well, (1) we
could claim that beliefs come indexed with "confidence" values, or something
(as some of you suggested).  More radically, (2) we could claim that there is
no fact of the matter concerning whether you have a certain belief or not.
[Sorry--that's sort of a twisted way to put it--all I mean is: there may be
nothing about your head (or your local environment) which determines what your
beliefs are.]  So, for example, we could take an approach like Dennett where what
beliefs you have depend on the theoretical framework we adopt to predict your
behavior.

If we go with something like (1), then our negative response to "you either have
a belief or you don't" is something like "well, no, you could have half a belief."

But if we go with something like (2), our negative response would be something
like "well, no, you could believe X from framework A and not-X from framework B."

Tim Maletic
CogSci & Phil
Indiana Univ

PS-I just recently started reading this thread.  I haven't seen a FAQ posted
recently, and rtfm.mit.edu doesn't have a specific FAQ for c.a.p.  Is there one? 
And, are there any regularly maintained archive sites?  Thanks in advance, and
you can email any responses straight to me.
