From newshub.ccs.yorku.ca!ists!helios.physics.utoronto.ca!news-server.ecf!utgpu!cs.utexas.edu!swrinde!gatech!ncar!noao!amethyst!organpipe.uug.arizona.edu!organpipe.uug.arizona.edu!bill Sun May 31 19:04:35 EDT 1992
Article 5954 of comp.ai.philosophy:
Path: newshub.ccs.yorku.ca!ists!helios.physics.utoronto.ca!news-server.ecf!utgpu!cs.utexas.edu!swrinde!gatech!ncar!noao!amethyst!organpipe.uug.arizona.edu!organpipe.uug.arizona.edu!bill
>From: bill@nsma.arizona.edu (Bill Skaggs)
Newsgroups: comp.ai.philosophy
Subject: Re: Grounding: Virtual vs. Real
Message-ID: <BILL.92May27211925@ca3.nsma.arizona.edu>
Date: 28 May 92 04:19:25 GMT
References: <4799@sheol.UUCP> <1992May27.042826.28187@Princeton.EDU>
	<BILL.92May27113824@cortex.nsma.arizona.edu>
	<1992May27.190604.6974@news.media.mit.edu>
Sender: news@organpipe.uug.arizona.edu
Organization: ARL Division of Neural Systems, Memory and Aging, University of
	Arizona
Lines: 30
In-Reply-To: minsky@media.mit.edu's message of 27 May 92 19: 06:04 GMT

In article <1992May27.190604.6974@news.media.mit.edu> 
	minsky@media.mit.edu (Marvin Minsky) writes:

   In article <BILL.92May27113824@cortex.nsma.arizona.edu> 
	bill@nsma.arizona.edu (Bill Skaggs) writes:
   >
   >  Turing, in his "Mind" article, began by saying that "thinking" is
   >too vague a notion to be useful, and proposed his Test as a way of
   >capturing operationally what is important about the human mind.  He
   >clearly intended it as a *sufficient* test (for "whatever is
   >important") and not as a *necessary* test.
   >

   [ . . . ]

   But poor Turing himself never suggested that this was either a
   necessary or a sufficient test for anything in particular.

He said: "The game may perhaps be criticized on the ground that the
odds are weighted too heavily against the machine.  If the man were to
try and pretend to be the machine he would clearly make a very poor
showing.  He would be given away at once by slowness and inaccuracy in
arithmetic.  May not machines carry out something which ought to be
described as thinking but which is very different from what a man
does?  This objection is a very strong one, but at least we can say
that if, nevertheless, a machine can be constructed to play the
imitation game satisfactorily, we need not be troubled by this
objection." -- from "Computing Machinery and Intelligence". 

	-- Bill


