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Article 5943 of comp.ai.philosophy:
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>From: bill@nsma.arizona.edu (Bill Skaggs)
Newsgroups: comp.ai.philosophy
Subject: Re: Grounding: Virtual vs. Real
Message-ID: <BILL.92May27113824@cortex.nsma.arizona.edu>
Date: 27 May 92 18:38:24 GMT
References: <1992May25.214006.29965@Princeton.EDU> <4799@sheol.UUCP>
	<1992May27.042826.28187@Princeton.EDU>
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In-Reply-To: harnad@phoenix.Princeton.EDU's message of 27 May 92 04: 28:26 GMT

In article <1992May27.042826.28187@Princeton.EDU> 
harnad@phoenix.Princeton.EDU (Stevan Harnad) writes:

   In article <4799@sheol.UUCP> throopw@sheol.UUCP (Wayne Throop) writes:

   >2. Why, in principle, is the TTT an improvement over the TT?

   Because people can do more than just speak, because there are
   other relevant give-aways to not being Totally indistinguishable
   than just pen-pal interactions, and because the TT (passed by 
   a computer alone, in virtue of doing implementation-independent
   symbol manipulation) has been invalidated by Searle's Argument
   as well as the Symbol Grounding Problem, whereas the TTT is
   immune to both.

  It seems that about half of my posts are attempts to reword other
people's arguments in ways that I can understand; here I go again.
Let's see if you agree with the following summary:

  Turing, in his "Mind" article, began by saying that "thinking" is
too vague a notion to be useful, and proposed his Test as a way of
capturing operationally what is important about the human mind.  He
clearly intended it as a *sufficient* test (for "whatever is
important") and not as a *necessary* test.

  Searle argued that what is important is *intentionality*, and tried
to show, with the Chinese Room, that the Turing Test is inadequate as
a test of intentionality.  You accept Searle's argument, but you go on
to say that an extension of the Turing Test -- the "Total Turing Test"
-- *is* a sufficient test for intentionality.  (Searle would not
agree.)

Did I get it right?  I have a response, but before giving it I'd like
to know if I've really understood your position corrrectly.

	-- Bill


