From newshub.ccs.yorku.ca!ists!helios.physics.utoronto.ca!news-server.ecf!utgpu!csd.unb.ca!morgan.ucs.mun.ca!nstn.ns.ca!news.cs.indiana.edu!mips!think.com!rpi!usenet.coe.montana.edu!news.u.washington.edu!carson.u.washington.edu!forbis Mon May 25 14:05:33 EDT 1992
Article 5669 of comp.ai.philosophy:
Newsgroups: comp.ai.philosophy
Path: newshub.ccs.yorku.ca!ists!helios.physics.utoronto.ca!news-server.ecf!utgpu!csd.unb.ca!morgan.ucs.mun.ca!nstn.ns.ca!news.cs.indiana.edu!mips!think.com!rpi!usenet.coe.montana.edu!news.u.washington.edu!carson.u.washington.edu!forbis
>From: forbis@carson.u.washington.edu (Gary Forbis)
Subject: Re: Comments on Searle - What could causal powers be?
Message-ID: <1992May15.003013.2275@u.washington.edu>
Sender: news@u.washington.edu (USENET News System)
Organization: University of Washington, Seattle
References: <1992May11.163332.27781@psych.toronto.edu> <1992May13.001033.14320@ccu.umanitoba.ca> <1992May14.164117.25016@psych.toronto.edu>
Date: Fri, 15 May 1992 00:30:13 GMT
Lines: 63

In article <1992May14.164117.25016@psych.toronto.edu> michael@psych.toronto.edu (Michael Gemar) writes:

[stuff deleted]

>I can know what properties my mind has, without knowing how these
>properties are produced.  If I can also demonstrate that some
>thing cannot produce those properties, then I've got my argument.

I'm beginning to believe this argument. 

>I have semantics. The symbols that I use to communciate in the world
>have inherent meaning - I know, since *I* am the one using them.

I used to understand this.  I no longer understand it.  Why do you say
the symbols you use have "inherent meaning".  Isn't it the case that you
intend to communicate meaning and you use arbitrary symbols to do so?
I don't think the meaning is inherent in the symbols you use but rather
that those recieving the communication infer meaning based upon the formal
aspect of the symbols used.

>However, symbols in and of themselves *have* no inherent meaning - 
>they are just "marks".

Now how can this be?  Either the symbols have inherent meaning or they
do not.  How does your arbitrary use of them give them meaning?  Isn't
it the formal aspect of symbols which give them meaning.  If you use the
wrong aardvark one has to rely upon the pack in which it runs to glean
meaning.  Too much misuse and others can't trample impel shortcake.

>  If you shuffle these marks around based
>*solely* on their formal properties, then these marks *still*
>do not acquire *inherent* meaning (*I* be able to interpret them,
>but that is a different matter).  

What makes you think the symbols you use have inherent meaning?  While
you may intend the symbols to have meaning your assertion isn't sufficient
for my acceptance.

>Sure, you may argue that I haven't *proved* that shuffled
>symbols aren't sufficient for the implementation of thought.  Fine.
>You haven't proved that thought isn't produced by angels dancing
>on pinheads.  

Garbage.  You can't link two arguments by placing them in proximity.

>It seems to me that it is up to supporters of this
>position to show how such a thing *could* be possible.  I believe that
>this entails conceptual work, and *not* empirical work.

If you can tell me how your intent for symbols to have inherent meaning
gives them inherent meaning I will consider showing you how the intent
of a computer running a program gives symbols inherent meaning.

>In the end I think that, given the current state of things, this issue
>is unresolvable (at least if the functionalists insist on being
>pigheaded :-).  In any event, this has been batted about back and forth
>quite a lot, and I suppose I'm beginning to agree with Chalmers that
>we might as well let it drop for now.
>
>- michael

--gary forbis@u.washington.edu



