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Article 5592 of comp.ai.philosophy:
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Subject: Re: Comments on Searle - What could causal powers be?
Message-ID: <1992May12.194417.31787@spss.com>
>From: markrose@spss.com (Mark Rosenfelder)
Date: Tue, 12 May 1992 19:44:17 GMT
References: <1992May10.001713.19164@psych.toronto.edu> <1992May11.202715.47273@spss.com> <1992May12.003415.7383@psych.toronto.edu>
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In article <1992May12.003415.7383@psych.toronto.edu> michael@psych.toronto.edu 
(Michael Gemar) writes (quoting me):
>>OK, let's say that the Bolivian economy, looked at in a certain way, can be
>>seen to implement an algorithm that passes the Turing Test.  But surely
>>there's nothing that *makes* it do that. 
>
>Sure there is, namely, the principles of economics, along with the initial
>conditions and any "input" into the system.
>
>> All the actions and states which
>>go to make up the Bolivian economy have a different explanation. 
>
>So do the activities of our brains.  They are (making the safe assumption
>that you are a materialist) 

Not a safe assumption, actually, but for the purposes of discussing AI I am.

>purely explicable on the physical, or
>biochemical, or neurological level.  No need for any of this spooky
>cognitive stuff at all...

Presumably cognitive events have neurochemical explanations.  There's nothing
spooky here if you're travelling from the top down.  Similarly the economic
transactions of Bolivia can be explained in terms of human psychology,
the physics of the materials involved, etc.  

The problem comes in going the other way.  Examining the neurochemistry of
the brain, is there any way to tell that there's a cognitive level built on
top of it which needs explaining?  Examining the economy of Bolivia, is
there any way to tell whether there's a meaningful pattern built on top of
it (e.g. an algorithm it happens to be implementing)? 

These aren't rhetorical questions; I'd really like to know, if you have
an answer.  On the other hand I hope you'll agree that there is in fact a
cognitive level in the brain, but it is at best an open question whether
there is an algorithmic level in the Bolivian economy.

>Your problem about ceasing to be an implementation only applies to the
>case in which the Bolivian economy *fortuitously* implements a 
>Turing-Test-passing program, and not to the case where it is
>arranged and manipulated *intentionally* (say by Donald Trump :-) to
>implement such a program.  Sure, it's unlikely that the Bolivian
>economy *currently* has mental states.  What I want to know is if
>it could *in principle*.  You seemed to suggest that the answer is
>"no", but it is unclear to me why.

Well, it's unclear to me how you and Donald propose to execute programs
on this device of yours, Bolivia.  If you're thinking that the economy is
so close to a functioning algorithm now that all it needs is a few nudges
from a rich investor, I just don't buy it-- if it's operating like an
algorithm it must be fortuitous and it's going to dissipate in time.
(Is David Chalmers here?  Won't we have counterfactual troubles here?
If some Bolivian decided to buy a poncho instead of a sack of potatoes,
would your algorithm disappear?)

If you're thinking the Donald is going to pay every citizen of Bolivia
to follow economic rules that end up implementing an algorithm-- OK, fine,
you've got your computer, but I don't see that you necessarily have the
economy of Bolivia anymore.  You have a bunch of Bolivians playing a game,
not unlike Searle's Chinese Gym.


