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Article 5446 of comp.ai.philosophy:
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>From: cpshelle@logos.waterloo.edu (cameron shelley)
Subject: Re: Comments on Searle - What could causal powers be?
Message-ID: <1992May7.155427.8603@watdragon.waterloo.edu>
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Date: Thu, 7 May 1992 15:54:27 GMT
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markrose@spss.com (Mark Rosenfelder) writes:
[...]
> 5. They cause minds like any implementation of an intelligent algorithm does;
> the similarity to other algorithms is masked by the fact that we can't
> change or read the algorithm or divorce it from its hardware implementation.
> 
> Well, have I left anything out?  Could some of the AI skeptics suggest
> where they stand and why?

How about a "homunculus" theory?

Seriously, I think Nr. 5 here is closer to Searle's conception of
causal powers.  From what I can tell from reading Searle's argument,
he takes "syntax" and "semantics" to mean `form' and `function',
respectively.  The "causal powers" he mentions appear to be a
necessary, but indescribable, relationship between form and function,
such that he concludes a form, the brain, causes a function, the mind.

In the Chinese Room, a form (the rulebook, ie a program) and a
function (understanding Chinese) are causally related by an already
intelligent processor.  Attributing an understanding of Chinese to the
room is fallacious by a reductio to the guy in it.

An objection I have to this line of reasoning is the implicit
assumption that form and function, syntax and semantics, are clearly
separable, and that a "causal power" relationship could therefore be
described between them.  This separability is a convenient assumption
when theorizing about human or computer languages, and human or
computer hardware, but not a reality in either case. 

For processes, programs instantiated in the context of some hardware,
input, output, and side-effects are not assured by a description of
the program or the hardware, at any level.  (Think of an operating
system.)  However, we cannot say that these dynamic effects are
without "syntactic" or "semantic" significance, or that any process
must be insensitive to this significance.  However, without a
description, it is impossible to say certainly whether such effects
would be manifested to a process "syntactically" or "semantically". 
For human beings, this sort of thing is often described as rhetoric.

Anyhow, by not assuming form and function are cleanly separable, I
think the notion of "causal powers" becomes a red herring.  This
doesn't solve the problem of relating descriptions of intelligence
with intelligence itself, but hopefully avoids a unnecessary detour.

				Cam
--
      Cameron Shelley        | "Proof, n.  Evidence having a shade more of
cpshelle@logos.waterloo.edu  |  plausibility than of unlikelyhood.  The
    Davis Centre Rm 2136     |  testimony of two credible witnesses as
 Phone (519) 885-1211 x3390  |	opposed to that of one."    Ambrose Bierce


