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Article 4173 of comp.ai.philosophy:
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>From: orourke@unix1.cs.umass.edu (Joseph O'Rourke)
Newsgroups: comp.ai.philosophy
Subject: Re: Definition of understanding
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Date: 29 Feb 92 22:56:50 GMT
References: <1992Feb28.211025.26278@oracorp.com> <1992Feb29.162020.9271@psych.toronto.edu>
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In article <1992Feb29.162020.9271@psych.toronto.edu> 
	christo@psych.toronto.edu (Christopher Green) writes:

>...the question of in "what way" the system is part of the man.
>The "way" is very simple. In the "way" that he memorized the whole system.
>In the "way" that there is no system apart from the cognitive activities
>of the man. 
>
>As for "reasoned" argument, I see nothing unreasoned about pointing
>out a glaring similarity between what's going on here, and what is
>described by [Lakatos].

	I may have missed it in the multiple postings, but I don't
recall you presenting an argument countering Hofstadter's point that
the system is not the memorizer; I mean an argument more sophisticated
than that the system is part of the memorizer.  For many readers of
this argument and counterargument, that does not add much to the debate.
You have only provided a meta-argument (the Lakatos reference and some
discussion of analyticity).  These meta-arguments are not convincing
to me, which may be my personal problem.  But it seems to me that if
you are right in your convictions, you should be able to argue so from
many different directions, and in particular, by directy countering
Hofstadter.
	Do you believe that because the man has memorized the whole system, 
it follows directly and obviously that the man's awareness of understanding 
must encompass the subsystem's understanding?  So directly and obviously 
that there is nothing more to say (except meta-arguments)?  This is Searle's 
position (I think).  This is not Mikhail Zeleny's position, as far as I 
understand, for he presented an argument dependent upon personhood.  But 
I gather that you are saying no argument is necessary?


