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Article 4151 of comp.ai.philosophy:
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>From: onstott@a.cs.okstate.edu (ONSTOTT CHARLES OR)
Subject: Re: Popper
References: <1992Feb23.223736.16566@ida.liu.se> <1992Feb24.231447.1827@a.cs.okstate.edu> <1992Feb27.233205.15015@ida.liu.se>
Message-ID: <1992Feb29.005805.11384@a.cs.okstate.edu>
Organization: Oklahoma State University, Computer Science, Stillwater
Date: Sat, 29 Feb 92 00:58:05 GMT
Keywords: Popper, world, rationalism
Lines: 56

In article <1992Feb27.233205.15015@ida.liu.se> c89ponga@odalix.ida.liu.se (Pontus Gagge) writes:
I wrote:>
>
>> AI research is primarily interested in determining the nature of Popper's
>>World Two(henceforth, w1-world one, w2-world two, w3-world three, etc).  The 
>>problem, of course, of determining w2 is that all that scientists can really
>>do is relate w1 to w3 by using w2.  In this way, whenever outputs
>>forced from w1 emerge they can only be matched to w3 but in no way 
>>give us insight into the nature of w2.  To argue that it is possible,
>>under a Popperian view, would be to confuse, or conflate, w2 and w3, that
>>is to confuse conginitive structures with the disciplinary world.
>>This sort of reasoning can be arrived at from Phillips _Philosophy,
>>Science and Social Inquiry_ in a chapter titled "On describing a 
>>student's cognitive structure."  
>
>I am not familiar with Phillips, but, to use an Americanism, so what?
 Its just a reference--why are you so uptight?
>If I remember correctly, Popper states that what we discuss are
>*models* (in w3) of w1 and w2-objects. This should be nothing new
>to anyone having some acquaintance with logic or mathematical
>philosophy. Are you trying to imply that Popper claimed psychology
>was nonsense?
No, you are correct that w3 models w1 and w2.  However, what strong
AI maintatins is that we can determine the actual nature of w2 by
way of w3--this is impossible, esp by Popperian standards.

>
>>  However, to say that all a scientist can do is relate w3 and w1 is
>>not altogether sound either.  So what I propose is that what the
>>scientist is, in effect, doing is creating another w2 by virtue of
>>w1 and w3 comparisons.  Whether or not that w2 is the same w2 as that
>>of a human can never be determined.  In this way, then, AI research,
>>at least from a Popperian view, is uninteresting.
>
>Wrong. The "w2" is a model, part of w3, and may certainly be studied.
>You could similarly argue that physics, being a model of w1, is
>uninteresting from a Popperian view.
 You must mean by "W2" my proposition that a W2 is created--If this is
the case, then you are correct.

BCnya,
  Charles O. Onstott, III



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Charles O. Onstott, III                  P.O. Box 2386
Undergraduate in Philosophy              Stillwater, Ok  74076
Oklahoma State University                onstott@a.cs.okstate.edu



"The most abstract system of philosophy is, in its method and purpose, 
nothing more than an extremely ingenious combination of natural sounds."
                                              -- Carl G. Jung
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