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Article 4124 of comp.ai.philosophy:
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>From: c89ponga@odalix.ida.liu.se (Pontus Gagge)
Newsgroups: comp.ai.philosophy
Subject: Popper
Keywords: Popper, world, rationalism
Message-ID: <1992Feb27.233205.15015@ida.liu.se>
Date: 27 Feb 92 23:32:05 GMT
References: <1992Feb20.231024.5959@norton.com> <1992Feb21.092037.6074@a.cs.okstate.edu> <1992Feb23.223736.16566@ida.liu.se> <1992Feb24.231447.1827@a.cs.okstate.edu>
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onstott@a.cs.okstate.edu (ONSTOTT CHARLES OR) writes:

>In article <1992Feb23.223736.16566@ida.liu.se> c89ponga@odalix.ida.liu.se (Pontus Gagge) writes:
>>onstott@a.cs.okstate.edu (ONSTOTT CHARLES OR) writes:
>>
>>[Omitted: Mr. Onstott's lengthy and somewhat incoherent irrationalist credo 
>> defending religion and Milan Kundera(!), denouncing soullessness of science]
>>
>>You are of course entitled to your opinions; however, this group is rather
>>more inclined toward rational discussion (with the occasional vehement
>>insult). I prefer rationalism (the critical variety) as it attempts to
>>resolve questions by discussion and criticism; religion and other 
>>irrationalist pastimes have no other ultimate recourse than violence,
>>as history shows. Have you read Popper?
>>
> Yes, in fact, I have read a lot of Popper.  I find Kuhn to be much more
>accurate and I have always thought that Phillips gave a good critique of Popper
>in _Philosophy, Science and Social Inquiry_.  However, I am not interested in
>discussing with you the nature of "disconfirmation" or "scientific paradigms"
>but would rather talk to you about Popper's three worlds.

> Popper(as I am sure you are aware--but there are others reading this),
>maintainted that there were three worlds:  1.) The world of things(material
>world), 2.) the world of minds and their contents, 3.) the world of knowledge
>and theories.  Instead of being a dualist, of which there actually appears
>to be heavy undertones, he was a triist(wow!).  

Actually, he was a very weak 3alist; he introduced his worlds in order
to enable discussion. His arguments with libraries are enlightening;
the w3-entities do not disappear if the library (a w1-entity) burns 
(horrible thought!); nor do they disappear when the author ceases to
think about them (where thinking is a w2-concept). The distinctions
were made in order to use language, with its inherent ideas of
persistency, in a sensible manner about abstract entities.

> AI research is primarily interested in determining the nature of Popper's
>World Two(henceforth, w1-world one, w2-world two, w3-world three, etc).  The 
>problem, of course, of determining w2 is that all that scientists can really
>do is relate w1 to w3 by using w2.  In this way, whenever outputs
>forced from w1 emerge they can only be matched to w3 but in no way 
>give us insight into the nature of w2.  To argue that it is possible,
>under a Popperian view, would be to confuse, or conflate, w2 and w3, that
>is to confuse conginitive structures with the disciplinary world.
>This sort of reasoning can be arrived at from Phillips _Philosophy,
>Science and Social Inquiry_ in a chapter titled "On describing a 
>student's cognitive structure."  

I am not familiar with Phillips, but, to use an Americanism, so what?
If I remember correctly, Popper states that what we discuss are
*models* (in w3) of w1 and w2-objects. This should be nothing new
to anyone having some acquaintance with logic or mathematical
philosophy. Are you trying to imply that Popper claimed psychology
was nonsense?

>  However, to say that all a scientist can do is relate w3 and w1 is
>not altogether sound either.  So what I propose is that what the
>scientist is, in effect, doing is creating another w2 by virtue of
>w1 and w3 comparisons.  Whether or not that w2 is the same w2 as that
>of a human can never be determined.  In this way, then, AI research,
>at least from a Popperian view, is uninteresting.

Wrong. The "w2" is a model, part of w3, and may certainly be studied.
You could similarly argue that physics, being a model of w1, is
uninteresting from a Popperian view.

>  At this point, my friend, you either have to accept this conclusion
>and remain strictly Popperian, or you must abandon Popperian thinking--in
>part because disconfirmation rests on disconfirmation of w1 analysis with
>w3 theory.  So the question is, if I had not read Popper, should I?

At this point, my friend, you should go home and re-study Poper.

--
/-------------------------+-------- DISCLAIMER ---------\
| Pontus Gagge            | The views expressed herein  |
| University of Link|ping | are compromises between my  |
|                         | mental subpersonae, and may |
| c89ponga@und.ida.liu.se | be held by none of them.    |
\-------------------------+-----------------------------/


