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Subject: Re: Definition of understanding
Message-ID: <1992Feb28.064104.9265@husc3.harvard.edu>
>From: zeleny@brauer.harvard.edu (Mikhail Zeleny)
Date: 28 Feb 92 06:41:02 EST
References: <1992Feb23.044200.29383@mp.cs.niu.edu> <1992Feb23.015634.9079@husc3.harvard.edu> <1992Feb23.225938.17078@ida.liu.se>
Organization: Dept. of Math, Harvard Univ.
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In article <1992Feb23.225938.17078@ida.liu.se> 
c89ponga@odalix.ida.liu.se (Pontus Gagge) writes:

>zeleny@zariski.harvard.edu (Mikhail Zeleny) writes:

>>In article <1992Feb23.044200.29383@mp.cs.niu.edu> 
>>rickert@mp.cs.niu.edu (Neil Rickert) writes:

PG:
>[The eternal Searle/Systems Reply debate continues]

MZ:
>>The fact that, in spite of having conducted interminable discussions on
>>this subject, you've yet to come up with a conclusive and persuasive
>>refutation of Searle's argument leaves me on the horns of a dilemma:
>
>>(i) Either you and your coreligionists lack the requisite eristic
>>*cleverness* needed in order to make a suitable impression on Searle's
>>public; 
>
>>or
>
>>(ii) The lack is in your abject failure to *understand* the argument.
>
>>In light of recent revelations of the vacuousness of the concepts of
>>reference and understanding, I suspect that (ii) is the case.

PG:
>There are of course three possibilites Mr. Zeleny ignores, namely that:
>
>(iii) "Eristic cleverness" is lacking on Searle et al.'s side.

Hardly so.  Searle may be lacking eloquence in comparison with Derrida, but
when it comes to the AI crowd, there's simply no contest.  Just look at
them scurrying around in the Boden anthology; they lose the battle before a
single shot is fired.  

PG:
>(iv) Mr. Zeleny & co' abjectly fail to understand the Systems Reply.

I can't think for the latter, but feel free to attempt a demonstration of
my personal failure.  Truth is, there's nothing to understand.
Incidentally, this is very nearly the answer to the Systems Reply.

PG:
>(v) Neither side understands the other's point of view.

Have you been reading Lacan lately?

Or was it Beckett?

PG:
>As I personally am less inclined than Mr. Zeleny to believe everybody else
>a fool (which is anyway rather an untenable position in this area, at
>least *generally* speaking); I suspect (v) is more it.

Unless you agree with the above luminaries that communication is
*generally* impossible (and the semantic eliminativism that is the
corollary of functionalism would surely force you to adopt that view), 
you can safely assume that this is not the case.

PG:
>OK, I will risk a continuation of the debate anyway. Mikhail, please help
>me. *What* is it that is insufficiently "conclusive and persuasive"
>about the Systems Reply? The "two minds in one cranium"? The implementation
>relation between them? I know this has been hashed out before; but I
>failed to see the pertinence of your objections. (Which is the reason:
>your eristic ability being insufficient, or my being a bloody fool?)

"Failing to see the pertinence of my objections" is hardly a valid
criticism.  Under the circumstances, the best I can do is recapitulate my
impertinence.  In short, personal identity presupposes continuity of memory
(this is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition thereof, but rather
the best we can do after two and a half millenia of philosophical inquiry),
as well as first-person access thereinto.  Another criterion of personal
identity consists in the felt continuity of volition, equally dependent on
a first-person view.  In other words, there exists no known way to
individuate persons without first granting their personhood, an assumption
that would beg the question of artificial intelligence.  Moreover, since
the conative criterion relies on the assumption of free agency, as well as
a first-person view, it is relevant that both of the latter are rejected by
AI theorists like Dennett (in his books "Elbow Room" and "Consciousness
Explained").  In other words, you are in no position to posit virtual
personhood without inventing a radical new criterion of personal identity.
Feel free to do so.

No person => no mind => no understanding.

`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'
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: Mikhail Zeleny                                                     :
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