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Article 4101 of comp.ai.philosophy:
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>From: chalmers@bronze.ucs.indiana.edu (David Chalmers)
Newsgroups: comp.ai.philosophy
Subject: Re: Virtual Person?
Message-ID: <1992Feb27.231046.15534@bronze.ucs.indiana.edu>
Date: 27 Feb 92 23:10:46 GMT
References: <6188@skye.ed.ac.uk> <1992Feb14.180030.48911@spss.com> <6208@skye.ed.ac.uk>
Organization: Indiana University
Lines: 30

In article <6208@skye.ed.ac.uk> jeff@aiai.ed.ac.uk (Jeff Dalton) writes:

>I don't know.  But some people seem to think brain simulation is
>a key move in an argument against Searle.  Evidently, they're
>relying on some property that brain simulations have that other
>program's don't.  So why would their conclusions against Searle
>apply more generally?
>
>All I'm asking is that they answer that question.  Perhaps all they
>can conclude is that programs can understand only if they're brain
>simulations. Don't you want to know how general the conclusion is?

This is silly.  Searle's argument, if it is correct, establishes a
universal claim: for no program P is implementing P sufficient for
mentality.  If a counterexample is found, then not only is the
conclusion wrong, but the entire argument is wrong.  Presumably,
if any brain simulation understands, including CR-style simulations,
then it follows that (a) "Systems" of person + paper can understand;
(b) Internalized "virtual persons" can understand; (c) the
"syntax-semantics" argument fails; and so on.  Searle's entire argument
would collapse.

Of course, the question of just which programs P suffice for
understanding would still be an open question.  But Searle's arguments
would now be entirely irrelevant to deciding that question.

-- 
Dave Chalmers                            (dave@cogsci.indiana.edu)      
Center for Research on Concepts and Cognition, Indiana University.
"It is not the least charm of a theory that it is refutable."


