From newshub.ccs.yorku.ca!ists!helios.physics.utoronto.ca!news-server.csri.toronto.edu!psych.toronto.edu!michael Wed Feb 26 12:54:38 EST 1992
Article 4020 of comp.ai.philosophy:
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>From: michael@psych.toronto.edu (Michael Gemar)
Subject: Re: Definition of understanding
Message-ID: <1992Feb25.224730.7021@psych.toronto.edu>
Organization: Department of Psychology, University of Toronto
References: <6594@pkmab.se> <1992Feb24.181821.19983@psych.toronto.edu> <1992Feb24.215328.18502@beaver.cs.washington.edu>
Date: Tue, 25 Feb 1992 22:47:30 GMT

In article <1992Feb24.215328.18502@beaver.cs.washington.edu> pauld@cs.washington.edu (Paul Barton-Davis) writes:
>In article <1992Feb24.181821.19983@psych.toronto.edu> michael@psych.toronto.edu (Michael Gemar) writes:

[in a never-ending quest to explain the Chinese Room]

>>You miss the point of the Chinese Room.  The question is *not* "How
>>would an outside observer *tell* if the room understands?".  It is
>>instead "Would a person carrying out the operations which give the
>>*appearance* of understanding actually *have* it?"  The introspective
>>aspect is *crucial* to the Chinese Room. It is *exactly* the issue under
>>discussion, namely, whether doing the manipulations is sufficient to
>>generate a *subjective* sense of understanding.  
>
>Assuming that such manipulations are even possible in theory, there is
>no logical reason why a subjective sense of understanding should arise
>from the same manipulations that produce an objective appearance of
>understanding. Thus, there is no reason to suppose that manipulating
>chinese symbols (as perhaps even native speakers do in some
>interesting fashion, perhaps so interesting it isn't really symbol
>manipulation at all) should give rise to "understanding".

*BINGO!!!!!*  Give the man a cigar!  This is *exactly* Searle's point.

However, for those who take passing the Turing test as a sufficient 
demonstration of understanding, this is heresy.

>To grasp this further, I suggest the following modification to the CR:
>add a 2nd person to the room. Let this person watch the other in
>enough detail to be able to draw the same conclusion as those outside
>the room - that based on the way the room manipulates chinese symbols,
>chinese is understood. Additionally, give the 2nd person the ability
>to 1) recognise the *form* of questions "do you understand chinese?"
>and 2) the ability to fiddle with the first person's response.
>Finally, for the duration of the experiment, have both persons
>identify with the room (that is, they can both be addressed as "you").
>
>I submit that the observed response, "Yes", is entirely akin to the
>introspective report received from a native speaker. The machinery
>behind the rooms ability to answer "yes" and mean it here are quite
>different from those that enable it to speak chinese, and hence this
>is a subtle variation of the System Reply of H&D.

You example is obscure to me.

>						  The whole point of the
>>Chinese Room is to show that the Turing Test is insufficient to 
>>determine if something truly has understanding.
>
>This depends on what one thinks saying that something "understands"
>actually means.

Once again, "No, it doesn't.  It depends on using 'understanding'
in exactly the same way you and I do daily."  

> If you take the view that all reports on brain/mental
>activity are external (including introspective ones), then any such
>terms are used in an "as-if" sense. This point of view says that there
>isn't any difference between saying "its as if it understands" and
>saying "it does understand", because there the property of
>"understanding" is a part of our *description* (be it introspective or
>otherwise) of a system in which "understanding" has any objective
>existence at all. 

Then you still have to explain why in some instances we *do* have a 
subjective feeling of "understanding."  And why the person who has
memorized the Chinese Room rules and carries them out doesn't (as
everyone seems to agree).

- michael





