From newshub.ccs.yorku.ca!ists!helios.physics.utoronto.ca!news-server.csri.toronto.edu!psych.toronto.edu!christo Wed Feb 26 12:54:34 EST 1992
Article 4014 of comp.ai.philosophy:
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>From: christo@psych.toronto.edu (Christopher Green)
Subject: Re: Definition of understanding
Message-ID: <1992Feb25.190316.7228@psych.toronto.edu>
Organization: Department of Psychology, University of Toronto
References: <43846@dime.cs.umass.edu> <1992Feb24.223405.28054@psych.toronto.edu> <43909@dime.cs.umass.edu>
Date: Tue, 25 Feb 1992 19:03:16 GMT

In article <43909@dime.cs.umass.edu> orourke@sophia.smith.edu (Joseph O'Rourke) writes:
>In article <1992Feb24.223405.28054@psych.toronto.edu> 
>	christo@psych.toronto.edu (Christopher Green) writes:
>
>But it still seems possible to me that the Chinese-understander
>subsystem of the memorizer understands Chinese, while the memorizer
>does not.  

Se my "posting of the day"; three back, I think.

> That the system is part of the man, does not imply that
>asking the man if he understands Chinese is the same as asking
>the system if it understands Chinese.  If you ask the system
>(in Chinese) presumably it would say (in Chinese), "Of course I 
>understand Chinese!"  And you would be in the same position as
>one who confronts a clearly competent Chinese-speaking frog.

But Hofstadter and Dennett make this impossible by pushing it back
one level from accessibility each time you try. Recall what I said
about them "analyticizing" the problem.

-- 
Christopher D. Green                christo@psych.toronto.edu
Psychology Department               cgreen@lake.scar.utoronto.ca
University of Toronto
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