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Article 3959 of comp.ai.philosophy:
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>From: c89ponga@odalix.ida.liu.se (Pontus Gagge)
Newsgroups: comp.ai.philosophy
Subject: Re: Strong AI and panpsychism
Message-ID: <1992Feb23.231152.17186@ida.liu.se>
Date: 23 Feb 92 23:11:52 GMT
References: <1992Feb21.162210.29101@oracorp.com>
Sender: news@ida.liu.se
Organization: CIS Dept, Univ of Linkoping, Sweden
Lines: 55

daryl@oracorp.com writes:

>Kristoffer Eriksson writes:

>> If Putnam is right, then perhaps any arbitrary lump instantiates the
>> computer and terminal that I am writing this message on. But, somehow,
>> I think there is something important missing in rocks and other
>> arbitrary lumps of matter, that is responsible for the fact that
>> writing this message on a real computer will make it possible for you
>> to read it, while writing it on a rock will not. So perhaps Putnam, or
>> alternatively everyone refering to FSAs without further qualification,
>> is overlooking something important.

>I think your point is correct, however some people are uncomfortable
>with it. The main reason that a real computer allows you to write
>letters, etc. and a functionally equivalent FSA found in some natural
>object (a rock, or a tornado) does not is a matter of interface.
>Whether or not a tornado somehow instantiates a computer terminal, it
>certainly doesn't instantiate it in a way that is useful to *us*. We
>want our computer terminals to have inputs in the form of keystrokes
>and outputs in the form of characters on a screen, and we won't settle
>for some weird (but functionally equivalent) object that requires us
>to use air-pressure variations (for instance) as input and output
>signals.

>Now, in the case of a system that is functionally equivalent to a
>human brain, we feel much less comfortable with the idea that
>something might be "equivalent to a human being, but not in a useful
>way". Because morality is involved when you talk about conscious
>beings, people are hesitant to say: "That rock may be conscious, but
>since I don't know how to interact with it, I don't care whether it is
>conscious or not". People feel much better if there is some objective
>sense in which a rock is simply *not* conscious.

>It seems that the overwhelming majority (perhaps everyone except me)
>in this newsgroup feel that being conscious or not is objective,
>independent of interface considerations.

The concept of there being vast universa of intelligences "locked up" 
in common rocks; unable to communicate with or affect the physical world, 
is somewhat staggering. We are truly priviliged to belong to that class
of intelligences which can manipulate the world. 

I think you have the correct way of dealing with it: as we cannot 
communicate with them, or even detect their existence, it is best to 
ignore them, and constrain our definition of existence accordingly. It
reminds one of the idea of there being "parallel" worlds (as in QM 
many worlds/global wave-function) which are equally inaccessible.
--
/-------------------------+-------- DISCLAIMER ---------\
| Pontus Gagge            | The views expressed herein  |
| University of Link|ping | are compromises between my  |
|                         | mental subpersonae, and may |
| c89ponga@und.ida.liu.se | be held by none of them.    |
\-------------------------+-----------------------------/


