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Article 3834 of comp.ai.philosophy:
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>From: GUNTHER@WMAVM7.VNET.IBM.COM ("Mike Gunther")
Newsgroups: comp.ai.philosophy
Subject: Re: Virtual Person?
Message-ID: <9202181833.AA12222@ucbvax.Berkeley.EDU>
Date: 18 Feb 92 18:10:47 GMT
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References: <1992Feb16.224059.19893@bronze.ucs.indiana.edu>

DC:
>As I've said a number of times before, it's not fading qualia per se
>that are implausible; it's fading qualia accompanied by fixed
>functional organization (e.g. you still *say* you see bright red,
>but you're really seeing tepid pink).  I can e-mail you a copy of

But I can be a functionalist about behavior without being a
functionalist about qualia.  Why can't neuron replacement result
in a behaviorally equivalent simulation?  The simulation would
continue to natter on about its qualia as if it had some, because
of the functional equivalence.  But it would not actually have
any qualia, being only a simulation.

During neuron replacement I can imagine the qualia dropping out
suddenly, once a threshold is reached, with no effect on behavior.
The simulation takes over to just such an extent as to compensate for
the loss of the real thing.  It is less strain on my imagination
if the qualia are lost all at once, but I think it's also possible
that the qualia fade.  The person might subjectively see pink, but
would still report red (cf. the inverted spectrum argument) because
the functional connection between red-frequency light and the spoken
word "red" has been maintained.  And I think that one could argue
that the simulation would also remove awareness of difference.  If
the subject tried to remember what red used to look like, the memory
would come out subjectively pink and therefore the subject would not
notice the change.

I am not claiming that this is the way the scenario has to play out,
just that it is possible as far as we know today.  I believe that
your "qualia all the way down" is also possible-- I just don't find
the arguments any more compelling on one side than on the other.  At
this juncture we don't know where the qualia come from, or what (if
any) parts of the brain could be functionally replaced in a qualia-
preserving way.



