From newshub.ccs.yorku.ca!ists!helios.physics.utoronto.ca!news-server.ecf!utgpu!watserv1!watdragon!logos.waterloo.edu!cpshelle Thu Feb 20 15:21:45 EST 1992
Article 3832 of comp.ai.philosophy:
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>From: cpshelle@logos.waterloo.edu (cameron shelley)
Subject: Re: Strong AI and Panpsychism
Message-ID: <1992Feb18.180114.12414@watdragon.waterloo.edu>
Sender: news@watdragon.waterloo.edu (USENET News System)
Organization: Evil Designs Inc.
References: <1992Feb18.044411.18663@psych.toronto.edu>
Date: Tue, 18 Feb 1992 18:01:14 GMT
Lines: 17

christo@psych.toronto.edu (Christopher Green) writes:
> >> In article <1992Feb14.152243.6535@watdragon.waterloo.edu> cpshelle@logos.waterloo.edu (cameron shelley) writes:
> >> >All I can add here is that the sort of work I refered to above takes
> >> >belief to exist a priori, and generally models it by various
> >> >truth-functional modal logics.  
> 
> ??!! But modal logics aren't truth functional. They're intensional!
> What might you mean?

I guess I should have added Montague Semantics to my list of examples.

				Cam
--
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