From newshub.ccs.yorku.ca!ists!helios.physics.utoronto.ca!news-server.csri.toronto.edu!psych.toronto.edu!michael Thu Feb 20 15:21:15 EST 1992
Article 3783 of comp.ai.philosophy:
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Path: newshub.ccs.yorku.ca!ists!helios.physics.utoronto.ca!news-server.csri.toronto.edu!psych.toronto.edu!michael
>From: michael@psych.toronto.edu (Michael Gemar)
Subject: Re: Virtual Person?
Message-ID: <1992Feb16.185904.9343@psych.toronto.edu>
Organization: Department of Psychology, University of Toronto
References: <1992Jan30.001623.12556@bronze.ucs.indiana.edu> <6188@skye.ed.ac.uk> <43302@dime.cs.umass.edu>
Date: Sun, 16 Feb 1992 18:59:04 GMT

In article <43302@dime.cs.umass.edu> orourke@sophia.smith.edu (Joseph O'Rourke) writes:
>In article <6188@skye.ed.ac.uk> jeff@aiai.ed.ac.uk (Jeff Dalton) writes:
>>In article <1992Jan30.001623.12556@bronze.ucs.indiana.edu> chalmers@bronze.ucs.indiana.edu (David Chalmers) writes:
>>
>>[fading qualia]
>>
>>>My point is simply that the fading case and sudden disappearance
>>>cases seem to be quite implausible, though of course they're
>>>possible.  This person with the half-silicon brain would be
>>>conscious, but not nearly as conscious as they think they are?
>>>It seems to me that the most natural assumption is that fading
>>>and sudden disappearance are unreasonable.
>>
>>Why?  If you replace a person's neurons with neurons that don't
>>work, what do you think would happen?
>
>I agree with Jeff Dalton's questioning of David Chalmers' feeling
>of implausibility here [hope I got who said what right]: fading 
>consciousness and fading qualia seem quite natural to me.  We all 
>experience periods of semiconsciousness, literally every day during 
>hypnagoic reverie.  Fading qualia are less common, but certainly 
>experience is sometimes especially acute, one sees colors as more vivid, 
>etc.  This doesn't prove that qualia can fade, but I don't find it 
>"quite implausible."
>	For this reason I don't find much force in the argument 
>contra Searle that depends on incremental replacement of neurons by 
>silicon, and reference to the implausibility of fading consciousness.

You are unclear as to what phenomena you are calling "fading qualia,"
but it should be clear from Searle's argument that, in order for
the argument *not* to be successful, there must be *no* behavioural
differences associated with the qualia fading.  That is, a person with
half a brain of silicon would have to behave *exactly* like a person
whose brain was all organic.  The examples you provide above seem to
show that, yes, we all "fade out" from time to time, but as well are
examples where our behaviour is altered by such a process.

- michael



