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Article 3703 of comp.ai.philosophy:
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>From: zeleny@brauer.harvard.edu (Mikhail Zeleny)
Newsgroups: comp.ai.philosophy,sci.philosophy.tech
Subject: <none>
Keywords: consciousness,functionalism,meaning
Message-ID: <1992Feb13.125625.8790@husc3.harvard.edu>
Date: 13 Feb 92 17:56:20 GMT
References: <1992Feb7.162533.4653@cs.yale.edu> <1992Feb7.232150.8611@husc3.harvard.edu> <1992Feb12.040025.14716@cs.yale.edu>
Organization: Dept. of Math, Harvard Univ.
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In article <1992Feb12.040025.14716@cs.yale.edu> 
mcdermott-drew@CS.YALE.EDU (Drew McDermott) writes:

>In article <1992Feb7.232150.8611@husc3.harvard.edu> 
>zeleny@zariski.harvard.edu (Mikhail Zeleny) writes:

>>In article <1992Feb7.162533.4653@cs.yale.edu> 
>>mcdermott-drew@CS.YALE.EDU (Drew McDermott) 

DMD:
>  >>However, I acknowledge that the theory does depend on a
>  >>"correlationist" theory of reference and meaning.  That is (as we've
>  >>hashed out before), it depends on meaning being objectively given by
>  >>correlations between model and thing modeled, and not being dependent
>  >>on "original intentionality" or the like.

MZ:
>  >Recall your earlier claims about semantics.  What determines the meaning's
>  >being objectively given by correlations, etc.?

DMD:
>I assume the apostrophe is a misprint, and the question is "What
>determines the meanings being objectively given by correlations...?"

Not so: the difference is that I was asking about the cause of relationship
between the meaning and the correlations, rather than about the meanings
themselves.  Never mind...

DMD:
>I guess I'd like to say the meanings *are* the correlations.

In virtue of what do they correlate?

DMD:
>I don't claim to have a full theory of meaning, but what we need for
>the present purpose is an explanation of "System P has a model M of
>system Q."  (In particular, we're interested in the case where P=Q.)
>It seems to me to be sufficient if 
>
>   M is a part of P
>   M goes through transitions that fairly reliably track or anticipate
>the properties of Q.  (I.e., the states of M are "approximately"
>homomorphic to the states of Q.)
>   P's behavior with respect to Q is caused to be "appropriate" by the
>states of M (or, if you prefer, the outputs of M)
>
>If a state S_M of M tracks or anticipates a state S_Q of Q in this
>way, we say that S_M "means" S_Q.  (Often it will be more appropriate
>to speak of a property of a state, which is the same as an equivalence
>class of states.  E.g., a symbol may be said to denote an object type
>if states of M in which tokens of the symbol are present are
>correlated with states of Q in which objects of that type are present.)

Before you even start talking about state-homomorphisms, you owe me an
explanation of how the states themselves are individuated (cf the Putnam
argument in the appendix to "Representation and Reality".  Worse yet,
there's a fundamental problem with your idiom.  Consider two systems, S_1
and S_2; say that S_2 is mapped into S_1 by a partial function \psi.  (I
hope you would agree that modelling doesn't call for surjective mappings,
or total functions.)  Now, it occurs to me that I would like to make \psi
into a total homomorphism.  All I have to do is to restrict it to S'_2, a
subset of S_2 on which \psi converges, and follow up by extending the
structure S'_2 by adding spurious members, and defining the values of the
extended \psi in an appropriate manner.  Should anyone object to this
practice, I'll ask: who's to say what there is? call the new members "the
inferred correspondences/correlations/what have you"...  Do you see my
problem? 

DMD:
>I don't think the occurrence of terms such as "approximate" and
>"appropriate" should be held against the theory.  For any given
>candidate M, we replace these terms with more precise specifications
>that fit the particular case.  The notion of symbols and objects being
>"present" will also require fleshing out in different ways for
>different applications.  Ponder the way in which "unicorn" refers to
>unicorns in a model containing a representation of "There are no
>unicorns."  It's entirely possible that there is no general theory of
>how things mean.  And I suppose that there will inevitably be cases
>where there is just no answer to the question, What does this state or
>symbol of M refer to, if anything?  

This is just an attempt at obfuscation.  I have argued that there can be no
materialist theory of meaning; so far you haven't said anything that would
change my mind.  By calling for some sort of morphism, you are just
supplanting the question of fixing the identities of things referred to by
the question of identity of referring structures.  In either case, Putnam's
problem will reappear, unless you choose to resolve it by postulating
expressive content for the sentences of your theory, something that just
can't be done on the materialist assumptions.

DMD:
>I'm sorry for the weird combination of formality and vagueness in this
>article, but I realize that this is the wobbliest part of my theory,
>and I want to avoid begging any questions.

As far as I am concerned, you still haven't succeeded.  Without
transcendental intentionality to fall back on, all your talk of
correspondences amounts to a manipulation of stolen concepts.

DMD:
>What I really want to say is that a the symbols used by a system mean
>"X" if the system behaves as if the symbols meant "X".  But I'm trying
>to avoid saying that it's a matter of taking an intentional stance
>toward the system, as if it were up to an external observer to choose.
>That is, they really do have the meanings they appear to have, because
>there's ultimately nothing else for meaning to mean.

That's right: the external observer viewpoint only makes sense for an
observer who isn't subject to the same causal laws that determine the
behavior of your system (cf Spinoza's mockery of Cartesian dualism as a
view postulating "dominions within dominions").  Unfortunately for you,
pace Putnam, there's always something else for meaning to mean: I just
constructed it!

>                                             -- Drew McDermott


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: Mikhail Zeleny                                                     :
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