From newshub.ccs.yorku.ca!ists!helios.physics.utoronto.ca!news-server.csri.toronto.edu!psych.toronto.edu!michael Thu Feb 20 15:20:23 EST 1992
Article 3691 of comp.ai.philosophy:
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>From: michael@psych.toronto.edu (Michael Gemar)
Subject: Re: Strong AI and panpsychism
Message-ID: <1992Feb13.020232.10408@psych.toronto.edu>
Organization: Department of Psychology, University of Toronto
References: <1992Feb11.223848.7203@bronze.ucs.indiana.edu> <1992Feb12.182033.4183@psych.toronto.edu> <1992Feb12.224832.305@bronze.ucs.indiana.edu>
Date: Thu, 13 Feb 1992 02:02:32 GMT

Dave, I apologize if you find this exchange frustrating.  I'm not trying
to pull any rhetorical tricks - I am genuinely interested in some answers.
That said...

In article <1992Feb12.224832.305@bronze.ucs.indiana.edu> chalmers@bronze.ucs.indiana.edu (David Chalmers) writes:
>In article <1992Feb12.182033.4183@psych.toronto.edu> michael@psych.toronto.edu (Michael Gemar) writes:
>
>>If I follow your argument correctly, your complaint about Putnam's
>>proof is that it assigns causal complexity to things which "obviously"
>>don't have it.  To be honest, I don't see why this is any more
>>(or less) problematic than assigning qualia to things which seem
>>obvious to me don't have them, such as atoms and thermostats.
>
>There's a huge difference here, which is that when it comes to the
>question of the existence of thermostat qualia, we're not in possession
>of all the relevant facts.  All we know about the thermostat are the
>physical facts, but the facts about qualia go beyond the physical facts
>(given that one isn't reductionist about qualia).  So the question of
>thermostat qualia is an open question, though it's reasonable to make
>plausibility arguments either way.
>
>Contrast the case of the simple clock, in which we are in possession
>of all the relevant facts.  We know how the clock works, its physical
>constitution, and so on.  Relative to those facts, the question of
>whether the clock has a certain causal organization is a *conceptual*
>question.  In this case it's reasonable to say that the very concept
>of causal organization rules out the clock having the same causal
>organization as the brain.  The dispute here can only be about
>how we use certain concepts, whereas the dispute over thermostats
>has real empirical content.

My concerns are *precisely* with how we use certain concepts.  You want to
rule out time-dependent definitions of states, and Putnam would like
to include them (at least, as far as I understand his argument).  My
problem is I see no way of adjudicating between you two. 

However, note that it is not *necessarily* the case that we have
all the relevant facts in this instance either.  *If* Putnam is
right, then any arbitrary lump instantiates any FSA.  This, on
my reading of it (which admittedly may be wrong, and I welcome clarification),
indicates that any arbitrary lump of matter instantiates the *functional*
relations of our brain.  If this is the case, then rocks possess the 
requisite functional states for consciousness/qualia/experience/whatever.
One gets panpsychism.  

Now, I presume that it is a matter of *truth*, and not merely interpretation,
as to whether rocks are conscious like us.  But, this situation seems to
me to be *precisely* the same as the thermostat example.    

>>Instead, I am interested
>>in *why* one should rule out Putnam's states on *non-intuitive* grounds.
>>Your argument that his states don't capture counterfactuals is such
>>an argument.  Simply saying that they miss an "intuitive, obvious"
>>distinction is not
>
>As I've said a number of times, the question here is the adequacy of a
>definition, and the adequacy of a definition depends on how well it
>captures the pre-existing notion that it was meant to capture.  There's
>no point in going over this again: I've made it as clear as I can.

Again, my apologies if we're not connecting.  Let me try one last time.
As I note above, consciousness for me is *not* a matter of interpretation,
but a matter of *fact*.  Now, it may very well be that states which have
time-dependent definitions are *in fact* sufficient to generate consciousness.
At least, this seems to be to be possible.  Yet, you seem to rule this
possibility out a priori.  What I want to know is why.  If you have
an argument as to *why* Putnam-type states are not appropriate functional
states, that would be fine (you have already suggested the counterfactuals
criticism).  But it seems to me that simply to rule them out a priori
is not sufficient.


- michael
 





