From newshub.ccs.yorku.ca!ists!helios.physics.utoronto.ca!news-server.csri.toronto.edu!psych.toronto.edu!michael Tue Feb 11 15:26:13 EST 1992
Article 3631 of comp.ai.philosophy:
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>From: michael@psych.toronto.edu (Michael Gemar)
Subject: Re: Multiple Personality Disorder and Strong AI
Message-ID: <1992Feb11.041458.1673@psych.toronto.edu>
Organization: Department of Psychology, University of Toronto
References: <1992Feb6.132111.9087@oracorp.com> <1992Feb7.224324.7502@psych.toronto.edu> <1992Feb10.193138.2974@aisb.ed.ac.uk>
Date: Tue, 11 Feb 1992 04:14:58 GMT

In article <1992Feb10.193138.2974@aisb.ed.ac.uk> jeff@aiai.ed.ac.uk (Jeff Dalton) writes:
>In article <1992Feb7.224324.7502@psych.toronto.edu> michael@psych.toronto.edu (Michael Gemar) writes:
>
>>I don't think it's an explanation.  And I think most animals have
>>experiences/qualia, which is all I mean by consciousness.
>
>Why do you think they do?  Maybe they just react in various ways
>w/o any awareness of anything.
>
>OF course, in the Chalmers view, they would have qualia.  But then
>in his view thermostats have qualia, and so animals aren't a
>particularly interesting case.


Well, although it was meant to be an offhand response to someone's 
question about animal consciousness, I think I can actually provide
a more motivated answer to the question of why I think animals are conscious.

Animals have an evolutionary history and biological makeup that is similar
to ours (at least, most animals do).  Thus, it is reasonable to suppose
that whatever mechanism produces subjective experience in humans is also
operating in animals.  I would assume that most functionalists would
hold this position as well.  However, note that there are many views of
qualia which are compatible with animals having them but computers not
(such as Searle's admittedly ill-conceived notion of qualia resulting from
special causal powers of the brain), but *none* that I know of that would
deny qualia to the kinds of animals under discussion but grant it to
fancy enough computer programs.  Therefore, I think the issue of animal
consciousness tells us very little about a position.  Presumably *everyone*
agrees that at least *some* animals have experiences, no matter *what* 
mechanism they think causes them. 

- michael
 




