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Article 3532 of comp.ai.philosophy:
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>From: chalmers@bronze.ucs.indiana.edu (David Chalmers)
Subject: Re: Functionalist Theory of Qualia
Message-ID: <1992Feb6.055620.23808@bronze.ucs.indiana.edu>
Organization: Indiana University
References: <1992Feb4.160229.20899@cs.yale.edu> <1992Feb4.193653.25027@bronze.ucs.indiana.edu> <1992Feb5.220638.9673@cs.yale.edu>
Date: Thu, 6 Feb 92 05:56:20 GMT
Lines: 27

In article <1992Feb5.220638.9673@cs.yale.edu> mcdermott-drew@CS.YALE.EDU (Drew McDermott) writes:

>[The dogmatic tone of the foregoing is due to the task at hand, which
>is explaining exactly what the computationalist theory of qualia *is.*
>I acknowledge that most people find the theory incredible, but at
>least there ought to be such a theory on the table for discussion, or
>computationalism has left a big gap.]

True, the theory seems incredible, in that it effectively denies the
existence of qualia, when nothing could seem more real.  The existence
of qualia is given to us far more directly than the existence of free
will or of solidity (in the strong senses thereof), both of which are
more like inferences than givens.

Nevertheless this kind of theory is probably the only remotely tenable
alternative to dualism, which many people find incredible for different
reasons.  Still, it seems to me that avoidance of dualism is the *only*
reason for accepting a theory such as the one you've outlined.  Now this
isn't an entirely bad reason, as there are good arguments why materialism
is otherwise an antecedently more plausible hypothesis, but it still
seems to be flimsy grounds on which to base a theory that seems to
blatantly contradict the apparent facts.  

-- 
Dave Chalmers                            (dave@cogsci.indiana.edu)      
Center for Research on Concepts and Cognition, Indiana University.
"It is not the least charm of a theory that it is refutable."


