From newshub.ccs.yorku.ca!ists!helios.physics.utoronto.ca!news-server.ecf!utgpu!cs.utexas.edu!uunet!psinntp!norton!brian Tue Feb 11 15:25:02 EST 1992
Article 3527 of comp.ai.philosophy:
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>From: brian@norton.com (Brian Yoder)
Subject: Re: red light / blue light scenario
Message-ID: <1992Feb05.215631.1194@norton.com>
Organization: Symantec / Peter Norton
References: <6539@pkmab.se>
Date: Wed, 05 Feb 1992 21:56:31 GMT

ske@pkmab.se (Kristoffer Eriksson) writes:
> In article <1992Jan30.012944.5782@norton.com> brian@norton.com (Brian Yoder) writes:
>  >Given that this whole discussion relies on a premise that is false (that 
>  >people can be identically duplicated by fancy machines) what importance does 
>  >whole line of thinking have?
 
> It might cast some light on the general concept of "identity".
 
How is that?

I find it interesting that Peter Cash has been insisting that philosophy cannot
be advanced by experimentation and observation (a point with which I disagree)
yet sees no problem with these imaginary experiments based on impossible 
premises (if I understand correctly, the machine was duplicating the person in
some kind of more profound way than just cloning the guy, right?)

My understanding on what Identity is is pretty straight forward.  Things are
what they are.  They are not something else.  That's it.  What more can you
add or prove or change by putting a guy in a duplicating machine?

--Brian


 
-- 
-- Brian K. Yoder (brian@norton.com) - Q: What do you get when you cross     --
-- Peter Norton Computing Group      -    Apple & IBM?                       --
-- Symantec Corporation              - A: IBM.                               --
--


