From newshub.ccs.yorku.ca!ists!helios.physics.utoronto.ca!news-server.ecf!utgpu!cs.utexas.edu!convex!cash Tue Feb 11 15:24:54 EST 1992
Article 3522 of comp.ai.philosophy:
Xref: newshub.ccs.yorku.ca comp.ai.philosophy:3522 sci.philosophy.tech:2064
Newsgroups: comp.ai.philosophy,sci.philosophy.tech
Path: newshub.ccs.yorku.ca!ists!helios.physics.utoronto.ca!news-server.ecf!utgpu!cs.utexas.edu!convex!cash
>From: cash@convex.com (Peter Cash)
Subject: Re: MUST Philosopy be a Waste of Time?
Message-ID: <1992Feb06.044858.27264@convex.com>
Sender: usenet@convex.com (news access account)
Nntp-Posting-Host: muse.convex.com
Organization: The Instrumentality
References: <1992Feb05.011716.8427@norton.com> <1992Feb06.002746.16389@convex.com> <1992Feb6.031729.14889@bronze.ucs.indiana.edu>
Date: Thu, 06 Feb 1992 04:48:58 GMT
X-Disclaimer: This message was written by a user at CONVEX Computer
              Corp. The opinions expressed are those of the user and
              not necessarily those of CONVEX.
Lines: 46

In article <1992Feb6.031729.14889@bronze.ucs.indiana.edu> chalmers@bronze.ucs.indiana.edu (David Chalmers) writes:
>In article <1992Feb06.002746.16389@convex.com> cash@convex.com (Peter Cash) writes:

>>1) Can a philosophical question ever be decided by empirical means? 

>>The answer to 1 seems--to me, at any rate--to be clearly "no".

>You've said this twice now, but it's clearly wrong.  For instance, the
>falsity of interactionist dualism is commonly held to have been
>demonstrated (or at least shown to be unlikely) by the empirical
>investigation of physicists and others, showing that there don't
>seem to be significant gaps in physical causation.  

"Commonly held" by whom, I wonder?  Certainly by neither philosophers nor
physicists. In any case, no amount of "empirical investigation" could prove
anything about "causation". Why?  Because the first problem in dealing with
questions of "causation" is "what the hell is it?"--and that's a
philosophical question. (And certainly not an easy one.) To think that you
can clarify a concept by doing an experiment is a pretty radical mistake.

>Now, maybe
>you'll insist that this just shows that the truth of interactionist
>dualism can't be a philosophical question, as it's a contingent matter,
>but here you would be disagreeing with a majority of philosophers,
>and would therefore be wrong by your own standards.

Of course dualism (interactionist or not) is a philosophical muddle--and a
prime one at that. Let me assure you that, while dualism is now
comparatively unfashionable, it has never been refuted--let alone disproven
by physicists.

>Furthermore, even if one held (falsely) that philosophy only
>investigates necessary, a priori, conceptual or analytic matters, the
>conclusion still doesn't follow, as matters in all these classes can
>be decided by empirical means -- e.g. the four-colour theorem was
>decided by observing the behaviour of a computer.

I never said that _all_ conceptual problems are philosophical in nature.
The mathematicians would put out a contract on me.


-- 
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
             |      Die Welt ist alles, was Zerfall ist.     |
Peter Cash   |       (apologies to Ludwig Wittgenstein)      |cash@convex.com
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~


