From newshub.ccs.yorku.ca!ists!helios.physics.utoronto.ca!news-server.csri.toronto.edu!psych.toronto.edu!michael Tue Feb 11 15:24:36 EST 1992
Article 3502 of comp.ai.philosophy:
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>From: michael@psych.toronto.edu (Michael Gemar)
Subject: Re: Strong AI and Panpsychism
Message-ID: <1992Feb5.183955.13789@psych.toronto.edu>
Keywords: panpsychism
Organization: Department of Psychology, University of Toronto
References: <1992Feb2.053646.625@bronze.ucs.indiana.edu> <1992Feb2.192512.24293@psych.toronto.edu> <1992Feb4.044728.12324@bronze.ucs.indiana.edu>
Date: Wed, 5 Feb 1992 18:39:55 GMT

In article <1992Feb4.044728.12324@bronze.ucs.indiana.edu> chalmers@bronze.ucs.indiana.edu (David Chalmers) writes:
>In article <1992Feb2.192512.24293@psych.toronto.edu> michael@psych.toronto.edu (Michael Gemar) writes:
>
>>Well, I must say that our intuitions are different.  I would certainly
>>argue that if *I* had no awareness of *all* my "beliefs", I
>>would think the term to be mis-applied to the states being labeled.
>>In this case, "beliefs" are merely *ascribed*.  In my view, what
>>distinguishes "true" beliefs from merely ascribed beliefs is that
>>the former carry phenomenal baggage, whereas the latter do not.
>
>Well, one can argue this kind of intuition about the application of
>terms forever, but the bottom line for me is that there seems to be
>no *value* in insisting that beliefs must have a phenomenal tinge.
>If we insisted on that, we'd just find ourselves inventing a new
>term, e.g. "schmelief", for the kind of quasi-belief that a zombie
>could have; and we'd find that schmeliefs do all the work for us that
>beliefs do in practice.  Belief is a concept that seems to play its
>main role in the prediction and explanation of action, so it seems
>to me (and to most philosophers of mind) that it should be construed
>as a functional notion.

But my problem is in seeing how we would distinguish beliefs from other
things which cause us to behave in a certain way.  If beliefs are *not*
phenomenal, at least *in principle* if not always (which I will concede
for now), then how do we know that the reason my leg flies up when you
hit me below the knee is *not* because of a reflex, but because I
*unconsciously* believe that, when you strike me there, I *should*
kick?

Other difficulties I have are elucidated below.

>>A Venus Fly-trap closes when an object brushes its hair-triggers.  Does it
>>close because it *truly* believes that there is a fly?  Or is that
>>merely an way of using intentional talk to describe a non-intentional
>>act?  I think the latter.
>
>More likely, it doesn't believe because it doesn't have the functional
>complexity required of a believer. 

But, if we are going to be purely instrumentalist, and use intentional-stance
talk (as you suggest is ok below), then how can we even talk about whether
it *actually* has beliefs or not?  I thought that all that was required
for the intentional stance was that it *acted* like it had beliefs.  Why
must we think that there is some functional complexity that is *really*
belief, and some other kind which *acts* like belief but *isn't*, if
all there is to beliefs is a propensity to act in a certain way?  It
seems to me you can't be an instrumentalist, and *then* claim that
certain functions are *real* beliefs.  Indeed, it seems to me that
functionalism *needs* some sort of "phenomenal tinge" to the appropriate
functional complexity if it is going to assert that only some actions
are the result of *real* beliefs. 


> Even if we require that beliefs
>be introspectively accessible, remember that even introspection can
>be characterized as a psychological, rather than a phenomenological
>notion, e.g., as a criterion that's probably too strong, we might
>require that possession of a belief requires the ability to verbally
>report it.

You obviously have a different notion of the term "introspection" than
I do, as I take as a necessary part of introspection that there be
*subjective awareness* that the states you are reporting *belong
to you*.   But I may be misconstruing your point here.

>>Indeed, one alternative way of looking at the question of "unconscious"
>>beliefs is that the use of the term "belief" in such cases is merely
>>taking an "intentional stance" toward states which aren't *really*
>>beliefs. 
>
>Well, I think that the "intentional stance" analysis of belief is a
>pretty good one (not perfect, but a good approximation).  Of course,
>an intentional-stance analysis of phenomenological concepts is hopeless.
>But if we insist that all psychological concepts require a phenomenal
>tinge, then it's going to be pretty hard to do any psychology, given the
>mysteries that qualia pose.

Well, an intentional-stance analysis, it seems to me, can't get at
the intension-with-an-s of a belief, and that's a big problem.
When Oedipus married Jocasta, he also married his mother.  It
is clear that his desire was to marry Jocasta, but *not* his mother.
But a purely instrumentalist account of desire (and beliefs, and other
mental terms) cannot, in this particular event, distinguish between these
two beliefs.  (My thanks to Chris Green for this suggestion.) 

It is also the case that we can have beliefs which have *no* behavioural
implications.  Take the (admittedly contrived) following case:
I have a belief that cats are actually extremely cleverly disguised
visitors from Mars.  I *also* believe that the Wicked Witch of the
West will turn me into a toad if I *act* like I believe cats are
aliens.  Surely there is some difference between this case and the 
case where I believe that cats are just cats, yet there would be no
behavioural difference.  I can also have beliefs about events that
happen in dreams, yet these have no (overt) behavioural consequences.


It is not clear to me if you feel that instrumentalism is a *necessary*
consequence for taking a purely psychological approach to the mental.  I
am not sure that that necessarily follows, but I think it's clear that
instrumentalism *won't* get us distinctions that we want to draw.


As far as the impossibility of psychology that requires qualia, would
you say that phenomenal psychology is either impossible, or denies the
importance of the phenomenal state?  There is a long, although very
quiet, history of the study of the phenomenal in psychology.  Or would
you argue that, in this case, it is not *actually* phenomenal states
that are being studied? 

- michael






