From newshub.ccs.yorku.ca!ists!helios.physics.utoronto.ca!news-server.csri.toronto.edu!psych.toronto.edu!michael Wed Feb  5 11:57:02 EST 1992
Article 3483 of comp.ai.philosophy:
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>From: michael@psych.toronto.edu (Michael Gemar)
Subject: Re: Strong AI and Panpsychism
Message-ID: <1992Feb4.220442.13002@psych.toronto.edu>
Keywords: panpsychism
Organization: Department of Psychology, University of Toronto
References: <1992Feb2.053646.625@bronze.ucs.indiana.edu> <1992Feb2.192512.24293@psych.toronto.edu> <1992Feb4.051044.11053@mp.cs.niu.edu>
Date: Tue, 4 Feb 1992 22:04:42 GMT

In article <1992Feb4.051044.11053@mp.cs.niu.edu> rickert@mp.cs.niu.edu (Neil Rickert) writes:
>In article <1992Feb2.192512.24293@psych.toronto.edu> michael@psych.toronto.edu (Michael Gemar) writes:
>>In this case, "beliefs" are merely *ascribed*.  In my view, what
>>distinguishes "true" beliefs from merely ascribed beliefs is that
>>the former carry phenomenal baggage, whereas the latter do not.  A
>>...
>>Indeed, one alternative way of looking at the question of "unconscious"
>>beliefs is that the use of the term "belief" in such cases is merely
>>taking an "intentional stance" toward states which aren't *really*
>>beliefs. 
>
> How would you describe the situation when:
>
>   (a) 	you have conscious 'knowledge' which is false;
>
>   (b)	you believe that you act on this conscious 'knowledge';
>
>   (c)	you have correct unconscious 'knowledge' on the same subject;
>
>   (d)	you act on the unconscious 'knowledge', all the time believing
>	(mistakenly) that you are acting on the conscious 'knowledge'.
>

Well, if you think that I would *both* believe a proposition *and* its
contradiction *at the same time*, then the whole notion of
belief seems incoherent.  I am not denying that the above-described
situation can't happen, but merely that if you call both "beliefs,"
you run into trouble.  (Note that I am *not* requiring that all the
*deductions* from one's beliefs must be consistent, but merely pointing
out that to say that the possibility of holding two directly contradictory
beliefs seems impossible.)  Now I will leave it up to you as to
which of the above items you would revoke the label "belief" from,
although I can't imagine believing that I consciously believe
something, but being wrong...

It is interesting to note that a related terminological debate has
gone on in the area of human memory with the discovery of so-called
implict or "unconscious" memory, where previous experiences alter
behaviour without the individual being able to consciously recall
the previous experiences.  Is such a person "remembering without
awareness," as some people have labelled it?  I think this is simply
damn sloppy, as "remembering," for me, implies conscious recollection.
It is also not clear to me that you want to label the effect of the
prior experience a "memory," since all sorts of prior events can
affect our behaviour without being accessible to conscious awareness
(when I break my leg, for instance, that affects my behaviour, but
isn't a memory).  But I digress...

- michael
  
   




