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Article 3474 of comp.ai.philosophy:
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>From: zeleny@coolidge.harvard.edu (Mikhail Zeleny)
Newsgroups: comp.ai.philosophy,sci.philosophy.tech
Subject: Re: Is understanding algorithmic?
Message-ID: <1992Feb4.163434.8471@husc3.harvard.edu>
Date: 4 Feb 92 21:34:25 GMT
References: <1992Feb1.015307.18388@ucsu.Colorado.EDU> <1992Feb2.020220.8338@husc3.harvard.edu> <1992Feb3.025904.19668@ucsu.Colorado.EDU>
Organization: Dept. of Math, Harvard Univ.
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In article <1992Feb3.025904.19668@ucsu.Colorado.EDU> 
boroson@spot.Colorado.EDU (BOROSON BRAM S) writes:

>In article <1992Feb2.020220.8338@husc3.harvard.edu> 
>zeleny@zariski.harvard.edu (Mikhail Zeleny) writes:

>>In article <1992Feb1.015307.18388@ucsu.Colorado.EDU> 
>>boroson@spot.Colorado.EDU (BOROSON BRAM S) writes:

>>>In article <1992Jan28.122457.8161@husc3.harvard.edu> 
>>>zeleny@zariski.harvard.edu (Mikhail Zeleny) writes:

BB:
>>>There are no ``causal relations'' in anything, as Hume has shown.  Reference
>>>consists entirely of a correlation between information in neural pulses (etc.)
>>>and information in the outside world.  Of course we can refer to objects
>>>that do not exist (Centaurs, sets, etc.) but this is always by a combination
>>>and reshuffling of our ideas about objects that do exist.

MZ:
>>Hume hasn't "shown" anything to anyone who doesn't accept the Lockean
>>empiricist premiss that all knowledge must come from experience or
>>introspection; even then, one could reject his argument because of
>>consideration advanced by Thomas Reid, that causal relations are known to
>>us directly from the experience of volition.  Furthermore, Frege has shown
>>that empiricist philosophy of mathematics is a flop.

BB:
>You originally claimed you could find a contradiction in the materialist,
>reductive conception of reference.  Your argument is laden with ideas
>that many reductive materialists would not accept.  I pointed out one
>such idea, causality, and you said that you could believe it if you wanted
>to.  That is not sufficient to reduce reductive materialism to absurdity.

It is sufficient to disqualify it from the ranks of contenders to the title
of the explanatory theory of the world.  Let's say that I feel that
empiricism has been conclusively refuted by my betters, and that my life is
far too short to reiterate every last argument they made to an audience too
lazy to look up references.

BB:
>What are your sources of knowledge besides experience and introspection?

Noumenal perception of the universals.

BB:
>(This must be knowledge about the physical world and not mathematics,
>since we are discussing cause and effect).  

Conation.  Strictly speaking, it should be assimilated to perception,
Hume's disregard of it notwithstanding.  See Reid, or the encyclopedia
articles on causation and necessity.

BB:
>I hold an empiricist philosophy of mathematical thought, but a formalist
>philosophy of mathematics.  We can reason about patterns, but I can't 
>think of a single area of mathematics that has grown neither from thinking
>about other mathematics or about the world (this includes number theory,
>algebra, geometry, analysis, set theory (transfinite numbers arose from
>saying 1-1 mappings of sets made them equal--an extension of finite ideas),
>differential geometry, topology, logic, etc.etc.etc.)
>
>In other words, No, I haven't read Frege, but I dare him to refute me.

I could think of at least three reasons why Frege wouldn't rise to your
challenge.  As for me, I simply don't care.  Still, when you manage a
necessary and sufficient criterion for observation sentences, let the world
know: ever since Ayer's valiant attempts were proven meaningless in a
Church review of "Language, Truth, and Logic", everyone seemed to lose the
will to try.

BB:
>>>In this interpretation, reference *does* have to do with external entities,
>>>since this correlation of information would not exist without an external
>>>entity.  Reference is not a wholly internal affair.

MZ:
>>I never claimed that it was.  Explain the correlation on empiricist grounds.

BB:
>When I have specific sensations of sweetness and sourness, redness and
>roundness, my Apple Neurons fire (unlike Searle, I do not consider
>hamburgers, since I am vegetarian).  
>
>In other situations, they do not fire.
>
>Of course, the obvious question is: could an outside observer, just by chance,
>find other neurons that fired only on Apple Input?  (Or replace "outside
>observer" with "homonucleus" or "CPU" inside the brain: why do we think
>some mental events "stand" for real events, when with proper decipherment,
>other events are also correlated?)  The answer is that if other events
>have been correlated in the past with the experience of eating an apple,
>then we will be classically conditioned to associate those mental events 
>with apples as well.  
>
>It is also important that such a correlation stand up to attempts to falsify 
>it.

Your very talk of correlation begs the question of reference in discussing
"sensations of sweetness and sourness, redness and roundness"; likewise,
any attempt to formulate a putatively true theory will beg the question of
reference in implicitly discussing the truth of its claims.  If you really
want to do without reference, try pragmatism.

MZ:
>>>>On the other hand, should one assume that neural pulses are connotative
>>>>signs, which refer by virtue of expressing an intensional meaning, then
>>>>such meanings, by the above observation, must be entirely captured in the
>>>>physical states of the brain.  Now, as I have argued elsewhere on the
>>>>Putnam thread, it's well known that intensions, once admitted, bring in a
>>>>transfinite hierarchy thereof; in other words, on the connotative theory,
>>>>reference depends on the grasp of (and, under the reductive materialist
>>>>assumption, physical embodiment of) meanings, which depend on meanings of
>>>>meanings, which in turn depend on meanings of meanings of meanings, and so
>>>>on.  For at each intensional level it is reasonable to interpret the
>>>>concept as yet another sign, asking what is the factor in virtue of which
>>>>it succeeds in referring to an object; in other words, it does us no good
>>>>to argue that in practice a brain or a computer only uses a finite initial
>>>>segment of the intensional hierarchy, for the question of the nature of
>>>>reference will only reappear on the highest admitted level thereof.  On the
>>>>assumption that the brain, like a computer, is a finite state automaton,
>>>>this amounts to a reductio ad absurdum of materialist semantics.  Moreover,
>>>>as is well-known, classical model-theoretic semantics is incapable of fully
>>>>characterizing reference, and ipso facto it is incapable of sufficiently
>>>>constraining any derived operational criteria that purport to implement the
>>>>AI notion of success of reference.  Thus, if I am right, AI projects of
>>>>creating a machine capable of signifying independently of its creator,
>>>>surely a prerequisite for machine intelligence, are doomed to failure.

BB:
>>>When I refer to something (say an apple) within my own brain, I am aware only
>>>of a web of sensory memories and abstractions derived from my experiences
>>>with apples.  Where does meaning come in?

MZ:
>>Like I said, this view doesn't work with numbers; see Frege's "Foundations
>>of Arithmetic".  Moreover, your awareness of a term's meaning is surely not
>>a necessary criterion thereof; otherwise everyone would ipso facto always
>>know what he were talking about.

BB:
>You meant to assert the contrapositive: a term could have meaning you are
>not aware of.  But yes, it is true also that people sometimes think they are
>meaningful when they are not.

Please try to abstain from presuming that you know better than I what I
"meant to assert"; any material conditional, as you are well aware, it
logically equivalent to its contrapositive.

My point is that your awareness of the meaning of your words is surely
neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition thereof.

MZ:
>>>>Now, in Mark's example, the machines are programmed in a deterministic
>>>>manner; I take it that this programming is performed by a rational agent
>>>>(N.B. for David Gudeman: this factor, pace Kant and others, serves to
>>>>assign all moral responsibility).  This agent stipulates the operational
>>>>characteristics of the machines to the extent that he is capable of
>>>>controlling their functioning within their environment.  As I stated above,
>>>>the machines merely succeed in matching an internal representation of their
>>>>location, as well as of some objects likely to be found there, with a
>>>>preprogrammed description, perhaps through the use of a visual pattern
>>>>matching algorithm.  The reference, if any, belongs to the programmer.

BB:
>>>I know positivism is out of fashion in some circles, but Zeleny seems
>>>to think showing someone believes it is akin to refuting them. 

MZ:
>>Not really; however, in light of the history of XXth century philosophy, it
>>suffices to make them look quite ridiculous.

BB:
>No, no, it makes those who would throw away positivism (instead of build on
>it) look quite ridiculous.

Once again, if you would build your edifice on positivism, it's incumbent
upon you to make good for its failures.  I eagerly await the results...

BB:
>Unless you think relativity and quantum theory were embarassing failures...

I prefer the Einstein interpretation of the latter.

BB:
>>>         And read Michael Freedman's _Philosophy of Spacetime Theories_:
>>>while relativity theory does not provide direct support for logical positivism,
>>>there is a definite but subtle historical link between the two.

MZ:
>>Of course, Einstein was as thoroughgoing a realist as science has ever
>>produced.

BB:
>Of course, his realism was strongest in his last 40 unproductive years.

I really admire your gall! as for me, I wouldn't produce such a claim even
if my own accomplishments were to eclipse those of Einstein's "last 40
unproductive years".

BB:
>He also praised Mach's ideas very highly and thought relativity embodied
>them.  His 1905 paper on Electrodynamics of Moving Bodies begins by
>criticizing Maxwell's theory for using unobservable theoretical constructs.
>Then his 1915 paper considers two isolated spheres relatively rotating,
>and does not accept that one will experience a centrifugal bulge because
>it is absolutely rotating... because again, absolute rotation can not
>be observed.

Having been born and raised in a culture that teaches respect for one's
elders, I prefer to evaluate Einstein's early work in the light of his
later writings.

>-----------------------------------------------------------------------
>SANDY: You will never find an acronym for my name.  It ends with Y.
>BRAM: But SANDY, Acronyms Naturally Describe You!
>
>BRAM
>Recursive
>Acronym
>Man
>-----------------------------------------------------------------------


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