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Article 3448 of comp.ai.philosophy:
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>From: rickert@mp.cs.niu.edu (Neil Rickert)
Newsgroups: comp.ai.philosophy
Subject: Re: Strong AI and Panpsychism
Keywords: panpsychism
Message-ID: <1992Feb4.051044.11053@mp.cs.niu.edu>
Date: 4 Feb 92 05:10:44 GMT
References: <1992Feb2.000933.29482@psych.toronto.edu> <1992Feb2.053646.625@bronze.ucs.indiana.edu> <1992Feb2.192512.24293@psych.toronto.edu>
Organization: Northern Illinois University
Lines: 26

In article <1992Feb2.192512.24293@psych.toronto.edu> michael@psych.toronto.edu (Michael Gemar) writes:
>In this case, "beliefs" are merely *ascribed*.  In my view, what
>distinguishes "true" beliefs from merely ascribed beliefs is that
>the former carry phenomenal baggage, whereas the latter do not.  A
>...
>Indeed, one alternative way of looking at the question of "unconscious"
>beliefs is that the use of the term "belief" in such cases is merely
>taking an "intentional stance" toward states which aren't *really*
>beliefs. 

 How would you describe the situation when:

   (a) 	you have conscious 'knowledge' which is false;

   (b)	you believe that you act on this conscious 'knowledge';

   (c)	you have correct unconscious 'knowledge' on the same subject;

   (d)	you act on the unconscious 'knowledge', all the time believing
	(mistakenly) that you are acting on the conscious 'knowledge'.

-- 
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  Neil W. Rickert, Computer Science               <rickert@cs.niu.edu>
  Northern Illinois Univ.
  DeKalb, IL 60115                                   +1-815-753-6940


