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Article 3413 of comp.ai.philosophy:
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>From: gudeman@cs.arizona.edu (David Gudeman)
Newsgroups: comp.ai.philosophy
Subject: Re: Intelligence Testing
Message-ID: <12184@optima.cs.arizona.edu>
Date: 2 Feb 92 20:52:30 GMT
Sender: news@cs.arizona.edu
Lines: 104

In article  <1992Feb1.011414.3680@csc.canterbury.ac.nz> The Technicolour Throw-up writes:
]>From article <12099@optima.cs.arizona.edu>, by gudeman@cs.arizona.edu (David Gudeman):
]> No, all I said is that once you know the behavior can be explained
]> entirely in terms of programming, you no longer have any motivation
]> for assuming that the behavior is caused by consciousness.
]
]Complete and utter balderdash.  Once we know how human behaviour can be
]explained in terms of neurochemicals, phonons, quantum effects etc will we
]cease to view ourselves as conscious?

I already answered this bit of silliness.  We know that we ourselves
are conscious by direct observation so an explanation of how
consciousness works will not change this view.

]  Its inherent in materialism that
]human behaviour is capable of being explained in such terms (even if human
]scientists never get to figure out all the details).

At least you have the courage to admit that your views on the issue
come from a religious conviction (philosophical materialism).

]> ]As long as there is only one reasonable way of generating a given behavior,
]> ]then that behavior is circumstantial evidence for that mechanism.
]> ][That is by applying the criterion of 'preponderance of the evidence'].
]> 
]> AAAAAAAGH!  For the 192nd time: THE VERY HYPOTHESIS OF THE TURING TEST
]> IS THAT THE BEHAVIOR CAN BE GENERATED BY PURELY MECHANICAL MEANS.
]
]Relax David and re-read what he said a bit more carefully.  If there is
]only one way of generating a certain behaviour then that behaviour is
]evidence that that particular process is occurring.  The whole problem
]with the validity of the turing test is that we don't yet know whether
]there is essentially only one way of achieving consciousness.

Why don't you read what _I_ wrote.  By hypothesis, a computer program
has been written that can produce conscious behavior.  Computer
programs are _different_ from consciousness.  So much is unarguable.
You may argue that there is some relationship between the two, but
they are clearly not the same thing.  And in the absence of any
argument relating the two, there is no logical reason for supposing
they are related.

]> That IS another "reasonable" way of generating the behavior.  If you
]
]I'm intrigued by your use of the word "another" here.  Have you somehow
]established, without telling the world at large, that if machines are
]capable of achieving consciousness that they must do so by mechanisms
]quite distinct in kind from those that humans use?  I thought this was
]still an open question.

The word "another" clearly refers to a "way of generating the
behavior", not a mechanism for achieving consciosness.

]> want to claim that the Turing test is evidence of consciousness it is
]> up to YOU to show that there is some relationship between this
]> mechanical behavior and consciousness.  YOU CAN'T JUST KEEP SAYING
]> THAT CONSCIOUSNESS IS THE ONLY KNOWN WAY OF GENERATING INTELLIGENT
]> BEHAVIOR AFTER YOU HAVE ASSUMED THAT INTELLIGENT BEHAVIOR CAN BE
]> GENERATED MECHANICALLY.
]
]Come on David admit it - you're a dualist aren't you?  The only
]interpretation I can put on your COMMENT is that you have already
]determined that no mechanistic process is capable of generating
]consciousness.  Your COMMENT seems to suggest that you've already made up
]your mind that consciousness is inherently non-mechanistic.

The reason you can only read it that way is because you read through
the article once for a first impression and the immediately produce a
knee-jerk reply without bothering to spend a few minutes trying to
figure out what I am really getting at.

I can take it by faith that consciousness is reducible to syntactic
manipulations and _still_ tell you, as I have, that you have no
logical basis for the claim that any particular set of syntactic
manipulations give rise to consciousness in the absence of any theory
for how consciousness does in fact arise.

]> That is the whole point.  Computers can't possibly be programmed to do
]> anything but give "canned" answers.  That's how computers work. 
]
]I take it therefore that you think that 'cc' or 'tr' or 'sed' give canned
]answers?

Yes, in the sense that the answers are the result of a set of
mechanical operations that are determined ahead of time.

]> The belief that the Turing test shows consciousness amounts to the belief
]> that computers are conscious _in spite of the fact that they are giving
]> "canned" answers_.
]
]So what you're saying is that computers can never achieve consciousness
]because they don't have Free Will (and that consciousness is absolutely
]incompatible with determinism)?

No, I'm not saying that computers can never achieve consciousness, I'm
not saying that computers can't ever have Free Will, and I'm not
saying that consciousness is absolutely incompatible with determinism.
All I'm saying (sigh) is that you can't take behavior as a sign of
consciousness without some argument for why the behavior should be
taken as a sign of consciousness.
--
					David Gudeman
gudeman@cs.arizona.edu
noao!arizona!gudeman


