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Article 3388 of comp.ai.philosophy:
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>From: chalmers@bronze.ucs.indiana.edu (David Chalmers)
Subject: Re: Strong AI and panpsychism (was Re: Virtual Person?)
Message-ID: <1992Feb2.044549.27812@bronze.ucs.indiana.edu>
Organization: Indiana University
References: <1992Jan30.170517.29673@psych.toronto.edu> <1992Feb1.212751.5911@bronze.ucs.indiana.edu> <1992Feb1.231914.25646@psych.toronto.edu>
Date: Sun, 2 Feb 92 04:45:49 GMT
Lines: 83

In article <1992Feb1.231914.25646@psych.toronto.edu> michael@psych.toronto.edu (Michael Gemar) writes:

>What is it about a rock that disqualifies it as an information-processing
>system, as compared to a thermostat?

The rock has lots of information-processing systems within, but it's not
itself an information-processing system; it's a lump of matter.  To
see this, consider two possible information-processing systems within
the rock -- e.g. the heat-reaction system and the water-reaction system.
If we allow that the rock is identical to these systems, then we come to
the conclusion that these systems are identical to each other, which is
simply false.

Thermostats are unlike rocks in that they are actually individuated by
their role in processing information, i.e. as a heat-sensitivity-and-control
system.  There might be other systems present in the same lump of matter,
but those systems aren't the thermostat, the heat-control system is.

>The point here is that an implication of your position, at least as I
>see it, is that any lump of matter *is* an information-processing system,
>in virtue of the fact that any lump of matter is capable of going
>through state changes (such as expansion and contraction).

I'd say that any lump of matter contains or embodies various
information-processing systems, not that that it *is* such systems.

>If you ascribe
>qualia to atoms on the basis that they are "processing information" (in the
>Shannon sense), then surely lumps of matter, due to their ability to change
>states, must be information-processing systems (perhaps even *numerous*
>such systems, since it isn't clear to me if you are ascribing separate systems
>to separate kinds of state-changes - it seems to me you must, otherwise the
>notion of one lump of matter, the brain, having several minds would be
>in principle impossible, since *all* state changes would be part of the
>*same* system).

Well, I don't ascribe qualia to atoms themselves any more than I do
to rocks, but yes, both atoms and rocks have various associated
information-processing systems, and so various associated phenomenal states.

>If this is the case, then recognize that it is also true that any lump of
>matter can be described as being made up of other lumps of matter (which
>can overlap).  Each of *these* lumps must be information-processors, and
>thus must have qualia as well.  Indeed, it seems that there are as many
>information-processing systems, and thus as many qualia-experiencers, as
>there are possible combinations of particles times the different "kinds"
>of information that these combinations can process (these kinds may be
>different for different combinations).  It is not only the case the the
>rock has "an" experience, but that that matter which makes up the rock has
>a near-infinitude of experiences!

Yes, there are indeed a lot of qualia out there, though I'm not 100%
sure how to individuate highly-overlapping systems (e.g. the neural
network and the subset described by another poster).

>I would like to digress a bit to get a better understanding of your view
>on what qualifies as "information-processing".  As noted above, you have
>in the past said that your use of "information" in this context is in the
>sense of "information theory", & gave a quote to the effect that "Information
>is a difference which makes a difference."  How far does this extend?  What
>*changes* qualify as providing information?  The reason I ask is that, as far
>as I can see, there are *innumerable* changes that any object goes through
>at a given time.  Take, e.g., velocity relative to another given object.
>Does a change in velocity imply a change in information in the "system" of
>the object, just as, according to you, the absorption of a photon by an atom
>counts as a change in (or at least processing of) information? 

That's a good question, and I'm not sure of the answer -- i.e. I'm
not precisely sure what kinds of states and causal roles are the right
kind to have associated qualia.  Maybe all of them, but I'm not certain
of that.  Change alone isn't enough, however; it has to be change that
plays some causal role.  Of course almost any change will end up playing
some causal role; but I don't ascribe qualia to the changing object
itself, but to the system of changeable-states-plus-causal-role.

Presumably at the very least I want to rule out ad hoc states such as
Putnam's states with time-varying definitions, but it's not entirely
clear to me where the line should be drawn.

-- 
Dave Chalmers                            (dave@cogsci.indiana.edu)      
Center for Research on Concepts and Cognition, Indiana University.
"It is not the least charm of a theory that it is refutable."


