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Article 3380 of comp.ai.philosophy:
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>From: chandra@boa.cis.ohio-state.edu (B Chandrasekaran)
Subject: Re: Thermostats, consciousness and derived intentionality
Message-ID: <1992Feb2.003155.24245@cis.ohio-state.edu>
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Date: Sun, 2 Feb 1992 00:31:55 GMT
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In article <1992Feb1.223105.9850@bronze.ucs.indiana.edu> chalmers@bronze.ucs.indiana.edu (David Chalmers) writes:
>  I think that stances are very
>relevant when it comes to explaining our ascriptions of
>representational capacity to systems, or beliefs and desires, say.
>But that doesn't work for qualia.  Qualia, it seems to me, are
>entirely real things that aren't dependent on anyone's ascription.
>I'm happy with the idea that representations are entities we ascribe
>in order to make sense of various systems' behaviour, but not so
>with qualia.  Qualia, unlike representations, aren't explanatory
>constructs; rather, they are phenomena to be explained.
>

I violently agree and I thought that *was* the point of the rest of my
posting.   In short, I was denying that thermostats have qualia,
but was asserting that intentional agents have qualia.





