From newshub.ccs.yorku.ca!ists!helios.physics.utoronto.ca!news-server.csri.toronto.edu!psych.toronto.edu!michael Wed Feb  5 11:56:02 EST 1992
Article 3379 of comp.ai.philosophy:
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Path: newshub.ccs.yorku.ca!ists!helios.physics.utoronto.ca!news-server.csri.toronto.edu!psych.toronto.edu!michael
>From: michael@psych.toronto.edu (Michael Gemar)
Subject: Re: Strong AI and panpsychism (was Re: Virtual Person?)
Message-ID: <1992Feb1.231914.25646@psych.toronto.edu>
Organization: Department of Psychology, University of Toronto
References: <1992Jan29.193358.19320@bronze.ucs.indiana.edu> <1992Jan30.170517.29673@psych.toronto.edu> <1992Feb1.212751.5911@bronze.ucs.indiana.edu>
Date: Sat, 1 Feb 1992 23:19:14 GMT

In article <1992Feb1.212751.5911@bronze.ucs.indiana.edu> chalmers@bronze.ucs.indiana.edu (David Chalmers) writes:
>In article <1992Jan30.170517.29673@psych.toronto.edu> michael@psych.toronto.edu (Michael Gemar) writes:
>
>>>Insofar as there are information-processing systems within rocks, then
>>>those systems have (very limited) qualia.  I wouldn't put the point
>>>by saying that rocks have qualia, as rocks (unlike thermostats) are not
>>>individuated as information-processing systems.
>>
>>What determines individuation?  These has the distinct odor of an ad hoc
>>distinction to me.  
>>
>>I think that the answer to this question is important, because (as you no
>>doubt can see), if a rock is an information-processing system in this
>>sense, then so is any part of the rock.  Then the problem becomes determining
>>*what* is having the qualia.
>
>I ascribe qualia to information-processing systems, not to lumps of
>matter.  A given lump of matter can easily have lots of distinct systems
>within it, and conceivably, lots of corresponding consciousnesses.
>Although human minds usually correspond to distinct lumps of matter, it's
>apparent that we don't have to individuate minds that way, as witnessed
>e.g. by the fact that it's coherent to talk about two minds in one
>body.  On the other hand, we certainly individuate rocks as lumps of
>matter.  Therefore I ascribe qualia to systems within the rock
>(insofar as they process information), and not to the rock itself.

What is it about a rock that disqualifies it as an information-processing
system, as compared to a thermostat?  As I pointed out earlier, it seems as
though there is a one-to-one correspondence between formal states of the
two, and even in the *physical* conditions which count as inputs.  When
temperature goes up, both rocks and thermostats change states (rocks expand,
remember), when temperature decreases, both rocks and thermostats change
to different states (the rock in this case contracts), and when the 
temperature is constant, both remain in the same state.  What it is about
a thermostat (other than its status as a manufactured object, of course)
that makes *it* an information-processor and *not* the rock?  As you have
pointed out in earlier posts, you are treating information in this
context in the Shannon sense, and not in the semantic sense.  Given this,
I fail to see the difference between the systems.

The point here is that an implication of your position, at least as I
see it, is that any lump of matter *is* an information-processing system,
in virtue of the fact that any lump of matter is capable of going
through state changes (such as expansion and contraction).  If you ascribe
qualia to atoms on the basis that they are "processing information" (in the
Shannon sense), then surely lumps of matter, due to their ability to change
states, must be information-processing systems (perhaps even *numerous*
such systems, since it is not clear to me if you are ascribing separate systems
to separate kinds of state-changes - it seems to me you must, otherwise the
notion of one lump of matter, the brain, having several minds would be
in principle impossible, since *all* state changes would be part of the
*same* system).

If this is the case, then recognize that it is also true that any lump of
matter can be described as being made up of other lumps of matter (which
can overlap).  Each of *these* lumps must be information-processors, and
thus must have qualia as well.  Indeed, it seems that there are as many
information-processing systems, and thus as many qualia-experiencers, as
there are possible combinations of particles times the different "kinds"
of information that these combinations can process (these kinds may be
different for different combinations).  It is not only the case the the
rock has "an" experience, but that that matter which makes up the rock has
a near-infinitude of experiences!


I would like to digress a bit to get a better understanding of your view
on what qualifies as "information-processing".  As noted above, you have
in the past said that your use of "information" in this context is in the
sense of "information theory", and gave a quote to the effect that "Information
is a difference which makes a difference."  How far does this extend?  What
*changes* qualify as providing information?  The reason I ask is that, as far
as I can see, there are *innumerable* changes that any object goes through
at a given time.  Take, for example, velocity relative to another given object.
Does a change in velocity imply a change in information in the "system" of
the object, just as, according to you, the absorption of a photon by an atom
counts as a change in (or at least processing of) information? 

- michael
 
 



