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From: jeff@aiai.ed.ac.uk (Jeff Dalton)
Subject: Re: Thought Question
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Date: Fri, 20 Jan 1995 18:59:39 GMT
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In article <3fm2km$odg@mp.cs.niu.edu> rickert@cs.niu.edu (Neil Rickert) writes:
>
>Let me comment on why I questionned the idea of innate heuristic
>knowledge.  There seems to be a common assumption (folk psychology)
>according to which people make their decisions by applying rational
>methods to their beliefs.  There is significant evidence contrary to
>this, such as that developed by Kahneman and Tversky.

I'm puzzled as to why you think this is part of folk physhology.
It sounds like the "rational methods" you have in mind are the
ones of "rational choice theory" (maximizing expected utility
with utilities derived from prefereneces, etc), which I wouldn't
consider "folk".  Or have I mixed up what Kahneman and Tversky
were providing evidence against w/ something else?

-- jeff
