Newsgroups: comp.ai.nat-lang,alt.cyberspace,alt.internet,alt.net-scandal,comp.ai,comp.ai.philosophy
Path: cantaloupe.srv.cs.cmu.edu!rochester!udel!news.mathworks.com!uunet!in1.uu.net!pipex!uknet!festival!edcogsci!jeff
From: jeff@aiai.ed.ac.uk (Jeff Dalton)
Subject: Re: Eliza (was Re: Are there non-humans lurking on Internet/Usenet?)
Message-ID: <D43qIr.DM1@cogsci.ed.ac.uk>
Sender: usenet@cogsci.ed.ac.uk (C News Software)
Nntp-Posting-Host: bute-alter.aiai.ed.ac.uk
Organization: AIAI, University of Edinburgh, Scotland
References: <jqbD3pB6w.94K@netcom.com> <D3qvLB.vy@cogsci.ed.ac.uk> <jqbD3t9Ct.MzK@netcom.com>
Date: Thu, 16 Feb 1995 16:44:50 GMT
Lines: 170
Xref: glinda.oz.cs.cmu.edu comp.ai.nat-lang:2917 comp.ai:27542 comp.ai.philosophy:25606

In article <jqbD3t9Ct.MzK@netcom.com> jqb@netcom.com (Jim Balter) writes:
>In article <D3qvLB.vy@cogsci.ed.ac.uk>, Jeff Dalton <jeff@aiai.ed.ac.uk> wrote:
>>In article <jqbD3pB6w.94K@netcom.com> jqb@netcom.com (Jim Balter) writes:
>>>In article <3hb12k$1le@mp.cs.niu.edu>, Neil Rickert <rickert@cs.niu.edu> wrote:
>>>>In <D3oxrJ.DHu@cogsci.ed.ac.uk> jeff@aiai.ed.ac.uk (Jeff Dalton) writes:
>>>>
>>>>>It's still sometimes difficult to convince people who "ought to
>>>>>know better" (a.g. AI phd students) that Eliza does not have "some"
>>>>>understanding.  Indeed, I'm pretty sure that the people in comp.ai.phil
>>>>>can come up with a number of arguments to support that view (ie, that
>>>>>Eliza has some understanding).
>>>
>>>Why it difficult to do this convincing?  
>>
>>I don't know.
>
>Perhaps the arguments given are not sufficiently cogent.

Could be, though it's not clear why much in the way of argument
is needed. 

> Perhaps even those
>who "ought to know better" do in fact know better.

They might.  But that would make their behavior somewhat odd.

>  Apparently you believe
>that the best way to support a position is to ridicule those who have
>a different position.

Perhaps I learned it from Dennett.

>>>Why can people in c.a.p come up with arguments of this sort?  
>>>Are they fools?  Are they in the grip of an ideology?
>>
>>Perhaps it's because they think philosophical disputes can be
>>resolved by looking in dictionaries.
>
>Are dictionaries irrelevant?

Pretty much.  Especially the less good ones.

>Do you have any other enlightening thoughts as to why people can come up with
>arguments that you apparently feel to be a priori (no rebuttal needed,
>apparently) absurd?

Where did you get the "a priori absurd" from?  I haven't said anything
like that.  Anyway, if someone has an argument that Eliza does understand,
a rebuttal might be called for.  But you're not going to get it from
me, because I have better ways to waste my time.  All I find interesting
in such discussions these days is which side people choose to argue on
and how this fits with their other expressed views.

>>>>I would have difficulty coming up with arguments that Eliza has
>>>>some understanding.  Or at least I would have difficulty doing
>>>>so with a straight face.
>>>>
>>>>>                                Whether they can come up with better
>>>>>arguements against the view is less clear.
>>>
>>>An interesting bit of innuendo, Jeff.  Perhaps you could move up to a higher
>>>plane and simply give us your best argument.
>>
>>For what?
>
>No, I guess you can't move up to a higher plane.  I was suggesting that you
>give your best argument agains the view that Eliza has some understanding.

Why should I?  Just because you want to argue against it?

>Do you have such an argument?

If I have any arguiments, presumably one is the best.  Unless there's
a tie.

But I'm simply not interested in playing that game.  OTOH, I was
wondering what might set you off again.  Now I know.

>>That it's less clear that people in comp.ai.phil
>>can come up with better arguments against the view that Eliza
>>has some understanding?  Well, so far we have one person
>>saying (quite reasonably in my view)
>
>Perhaps you could give your reasoning.
>
>I see that you are keeping counts on arguments again, as with the "pro-TT
>argument", of the numbers of people on each "side".  A natural thing to do,
>seeing as how highly you were lauded for this approach to philosophy the last
>time around.

I wasn't counting then, but this time it's still early enough to make
it easy, so why not?

Since those who disagreed with me last time prsented wild distortions
of my position (eg, that I was talking about a conspiracy), their
reaction was rather instructive, though not in the way you seem to
think.

>>"it is so obvious that
>>there is no understanding, I cannot easily comprehend what it
>>is that I am supposed to be arguing against", and we have
>>one person arguing that Eliza does have some understanding.
>
>Why do you find these meta-facts interesting or worth noting?

What exactly are you disagreeing with me about?  Whether or not
Eliza understands?  Or meta-issues?

>>>>If asked to argue against Eliza understanding, I would be
>>>>nonplussed.  It is so obvious that there is no understanding, I
>>>>cannot easily comprehend what it is that I am supposed to be arguing
>>>>against.
>>>
>>>Given this definition of understanding from Random House 2nd ed.:
>>> 	
>>>	knowledge of or familiarity with a particular thing; skill in dealing
>>>	with or handling something
>>>
>>>I would say that Eliza displays *some* understanding.  
>>
>>Well, there's one argument from comp.ai.phil in support of Eliza
>>having some understanding.
>
>Well, I suppose that you could tally it up that way.  More sophisticated
>readers such as Neil Rickert may grasp that I was getting at something
>deeper, such as that clarity of the meanings of terms is relevant.

So why the dictionary quote?

>>>Perhaps if you or Jeff
>>>could offer your definitions of the word, any disagreement over the issue
>>>could be resolved.
>>
>>It'll just turn into arguments about the definitions.
>
>Wheras if we minimize clarity of meaning we can have nice calm discussions,
>eh? 

If we don't play the definition game, and thus end up arguing about
definitions, we might.

> Incredibly enough, Jeff, one can point out that *given* a particular
>definition some conclusion does or does not follow, as I did above. 

Sure, but it can be rather question-begging.

>This
>process can be used to clarify meanings, explore nuances, uncover assumptions,
>deconstruct ambiguities, do philosophy. 

Philosphpers spend rather little time playing the definition game.

>Rather than make a career out of
>pointing out that people who ought to know better don't, that pro-TT arguments
>are "shaping up nicely", that Dan Dennett distorts Hardin only no you can't
>show it but then again Mark Rosenfelder can't show he doesn't nah nah nah.

There is an interesting pattern.  People make various assertions,
and when I question them, suddenly it's up to me to prove they're
wrong.  Why isn't it up to them to back up their assertions?

BTW, I don't know whether Dennett is distorting Hardin.  Dennett
is rather unclear on just what he thinks Hardin's views is, and
I haven't seen anything from Hardin that explains his views on
"filling in" in sufficient detail for me to say how close they
are to what Dennett seems to be talking about.  But the primary
issue is what Dennett has shown; and in this case it's not very
much.

-- j
