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From: pindor@gpu.utcc.utoronto.ca (Andrzej Pindor)
Subject: Re: A New Theory of Free Will -- continuation of an Open Letter to Professor Penrose
Message-ID: <Dn71Ht.BD8@gpu.utcc.utoronto.ca>
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References: <4el6ee$4t6@brtph500.bnr.ca> <4gcehp$8an@amenti.rutgers.edu> <Pine.SUN.3.91.960221144235.23074D-100000@ucsbuxa.ucsb.edu> <4ghpol$9vh@amenti.rutgers.edu>
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Date: Thu, 22 Feb 1996 20:13:04 GMT
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Xref: glinda.oz.cs.cmu.edu sci.physics:172745 comp.ai:37241 comp.ai.philosophy:38088 sci.philosophy.meta:24968

In article <4ghpol$9vh@amenti.rutgers.edu>,
Michael Huemer <owl@rci.rutgers.edu> wrote:
>Aaron Boyden <6500adb@ucsbuxa.ucsb.edu> writes:
>
>>You've taken a poll?  In any event, I ought perhaps to have inserted 
>>"incompatibilist" in front of "free will", though I think the remainder 
>>of what I said should have made that clear.  Perhaps if compatibilists 
>>are counted, a majority of philosophers accept free will, but otherwise 
>>I'm pretty sure you're wrong.
>
>By philosophers who accept FW, I meant philosophers that if you asked
>them, "Do we have free will?" would say "yes."

Are you sure that all of them would mean the same thing though?

>   There aren't TWO kinds of FW, as you keep implying.  What you made
>clear in your post was that you are ASSUMING that incompatibilism is
>CORRECT.  I don't assume that.  It can be argued for, but the
>arguments for it are not so compelling as the belief in free will.
>
The main problem here (and this extends to the rest of your posting) is
that you assume that the two words "free will" (or these ten letters plus 
space between them) have some absolute meaning. I agree with Wittgenstein
that they don't, that the meaning is determined by use and different people
may use these two words differently. In fact, even if there was
an absolute meaning to these words, what is a guarantee that everyone using
them would know it? It should be obvious to you that various people mean
different things when they use these words - some mean "compatibilist free
will", some mean "incompatibilist free will". Which one, if any, exists (in 
the sense that it drives human choices) is a totally different issue.
Just like when people say UFO, some may mean just unexplained physcial 
phenomena (say, ball lightning), some may mean alien spacecraft, some other
may think of it as a spycraft of an evil foreign power. Which one it is,
is a totally different subject, perhaps it does not in fact exist at all
and the sightings are a result of delusions. In a disussion of the phenomenon
it is important what meaning is being used by the people who talk about it
and inisting that if, for instance, UFOs are not alien spacecraft then there 
are no UFOs is silly.

>...
><sigh>  Is there no game on the net but burden tennis?  I've
>previously posted a series of definitions of FW on this newsgroup
>(a.p.o).  Let's just take one:  You have FW if and only if, sometimes
>you are in a situation in which there exist multiple alternative
>courses of action, each of which you could perform.
>
Your definition is meaningless since it would also apply to a stone sitting
atop a rock - it can fall off to the north, south, west, east and it can also
stay where it is.

>>But what has that got to do with freedom of the will?  A rock could crush 
>
>See above def.
>
>>> (a) What makes you think free will is mystical?
>>Its historical origins, mostly.
>
>See above def. again.  This concept does not have its origins in
>religion or mysticism; it's part of common sense.
>
Not so long ago it was a part of common sense that one can be possesed by
a devil. Now we call it a mental illness.

>>> (b) What makes you think choices ARE determined by previous events?
>>It doesn't matter whether they are or not; they're surely not free.  
>
>I don't see that.
>
Again, perhaps your meaning of the word "free" is different that the one
used by Aaron Boyden. I wouldn't either call "free" an action which is 
determined (at least not ordinarily)

>>However, people's actions are too easily explainable in terms of previous 
>>events for me to take seriously that the previous events aren't really 
>>the explanation.
>
>I don't see that either.  I'd be surprised if you could explain any
>single human action in terms of a set of sufficient causes.
>
I have had an impression that you are a compatibilist, are you?

>>> (c) What makes you think that such determination is incompatible with
>>> free will?
>>The assumption that contra-causal free will is intended.  If we're not 
>>discussing contra-causal free will, then obviously free will exists, but 
>>I hardly see that as very interesting.
>
>In other words, we're *assuming* that incompatibilism is *true*?  Why
>do you assume this?  

I do not see such assumption at all. The only assumption on the part of Aaron 
Boyden is that when people say "free will" most of them _mean_ incomptaibilist
notion of "free will". And I agree with him that this is most common
understanding. If you read carefully what people write here, you should have
noticed it.

<..............What if it's just false?

Then there is no such thing as "incompatibilist free will". Note however 
that this is a moot point, because due to its nature "incomptibilist free
will" it cannot be either proven or disproven. It is just a matter of faith.
In other words it is "mystical".

>   You seem to be thinking that compatibilists do nothing more than
>just redefine "free will" in such a way that it becomes trivial that
>we have it, and this is uninteresting because it's just changing the
>subject.  But that is just to assume the incompatibilists are right!

Yes, this is what I think they do, but why does it mean that the incompatibi-
lists are right, is beyond me. Does the fact that people who do not believe
in little green men (and women) from Mars (who travel here using their 
crockware) still use the word UFO to mean unexplained physical phenomena
proves that there are green people from Mars?? Could you explain your logic,
please?

>   The compatibilists say that they are NOT redefining FW, that they
>are telling you the true meaning of it, in the sense in which we are
>interested in it; and that it is the incompatibilists who are
>redefining the word, imposing some ridiculously high standards on
>their invented conception of 'freedom'.  Btw, see Peter van Inwagen's
>article "When Is the Will Free?" for more on the fact that the is not
>an 'incompatibilist sense' of FW or a 'compatibilist sense' of FW
>(among other things).

It is all a silly quarrel which meaning is the "right" meaning. 

>   If the compatibilist is wrong, he is wrong not just about what
>other people mean by "free will"; he is wrong about what he himself
>means by "free will."
>
How can you be wrong about what you mean yourself by something? You are free
to mean whatever you wish (at least in a democratic society :-)), you only
risk that others will misunderstood you if they mean something else.
Can you explain the above, it sounds to me like logic from Mars :-).
.....................
>
>It would be like your faculty of reason.  Just like how, when you are
>presented with conflicting evidence, you weigh them against each other
>to make a judgement; when you are presented with conflicting motives,
>you weigh them, etc.
>
It sounds pretty much like a line in a program "if then ... else ...", right?
Would you really call such a decision "free"?

>I did not realize that you thought in this confused way about there
>being a 'compatibilist free will' and an 'incompatibilist free will'.
>
>>The existence of 
>>such free will is so obvious as to not require argument. 
>
>No, it is not obvious that there is any such thing as "compatibilist
>free will".  Look, it's like this:  suppose we're not sure whether
>Goldbach's conjecture is true or not.  Then we are not sure whether
>the concept of an even number is compatible with the concept of not
>being the sum of two primes (that's one way to look at it).  But
>whether it is or not is just a matter of fact.  It's not that there is
>a compatibilist sense of "even number" and an incompatibilist sense,
>and it's just trivial that in one sense G's conjecture is true and in
>the other sense it isn't.  No, it's a real issue.

Since we do not know for sure if Goldbach conjecture is true, it is possibile 
that even numbers are compatible with ... or that they are not compatible, 
right? 

>Likewise, whether compatibilism is true or false is a real issue.  If
>it is false, then there is no compatibilist free will.
>
You are not suggesting that if even numbers are not compatible with ...
then there are no even numbers?
The same way if there is no compatibilist free will, there still can be
the incompatiblist one (except that this cannot be rationally decided).

..............
>I'm just annoyed at having to confront the same thing over and over:
>someone posts a message just *assuming* without argument that
>incompatibilism is true, then asserting that there is no FW, because
>FW is absurd, also assuming that determinism is true.  The popularity
>of denying FW particularly annoys me, since I think everyone knows we
>have free will (again, see above def'n).  It's like if you saw a bunch
>of people insisting that the notion of a physical world is absurd, or
>that there obviously couldn't be any such things as trees, etc.
>
You are unnecessarily annoyed. Just try to understand that people may be
using words in a sense different from you. After all you do not have 
a monopoly on what the (English) words mean, do you? Usually, people who deny
FW mean it in the incompatibilist sense. Statement "every one knows we have
free will" is naive, because there is no way to define it uniquely. Your 
definition does not cut it, as I have pointed out above. In fact, if one 
considers the usual meaning of the words "free" and "will", the concept "free
will" is logically contradictory.

>I don't agree with you, because I think the existence of FW is
>certain.  I therefore think that if you become convinced that FW is

There is nothing certain (except death and taxes :-)). Philosophers like
to cling to the notions of absolute "truth" because it gives them the 
comfort of believing that they are on to something without leaving their
armchairs. If they had left them they would have to confront the ugly reality
which is all shades of grey - no black and white to be seen anywhere.

>incompatible with determinism, the rational conclusion to draw is that
>determinism is false.  On the other hand, if you become convinced that
>determinism is true, the only rational conclusion to draw is that
>compatibilism is also true.  In this event you do not say that we lack
>something called 'incompatibilist free will'; instead, you say that we
>have free will, simply, and "incompatibilist free will" is just an
>oxymoron.  In no event do I think it would be rational to reject FW.
>-- 
>                                                         ^-----^ 
>   Michael Huemer <owl@rci.rutgers.edu>                 / O   O \ 
>   Rutgers Univ. (Philosophy Dept.)                     |   V   | 
>                                                         \     / 
Andrzej
-- 
Andrzej Pindor                        The foolish reject what they see and 
University of Toronto                 not what they think; the wise reject
Information Commons                   what they think and not what they see.
pindor@breeze.hprc.utoronto.ca                      Huang Po
