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From: jeff@cogsci.ed.ac.uk (Jeff Dalton)
Subject: Re: The only acceptable def. of Free Will
Message-ID: <DMF4qI.8B0.0.macbeth@cogsci.ed.ac.uk>
Organization: Centre for Cognitive Science, Edinburgh, UK
References: <4er5uf$9lm@news-rocq.inria.fr>
Date: Wed, 7 Feb 1996 18:30:17 GMT
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ziane@noemie.inria.fr (Mikal Ziane (Univ. Paris 5 and INRIA) ) writes:

>It does not look like the threads on Free Will and determinism are progressing
>very rapidly while I really see no difficulty at all.

>The first thing is to define Free Will.
>I have already posted my proposed definition [...]

>(weak) Free Will is the ability to take decisions in agreement with your
>"core personality".

>Note that I do NOT say that your decisions are determined by yourself because
>this is at least confusing.

>What I say is that free will means that your decisions are COMPATIBLE with 
>your main objectives, principles or desires.

I think your definition is basically a fairly good one.  If you
haven't already, you may want to take a look at some of Harry
Frankfort's papers where he discusses the role of (I think this
is the phrase) "2nd-order desires" (ie, desires about desires).

(Sorry for not saying exactly what papers, where.  I don't have 
that information handy, but I can give a more precise ref later, 
if you'd like.  The Watson-edited _Free Will_ collection (Oxford
University Press) will do for a start.  Frankfort has a book
of papers called, I think, _The Importance of what we Care About_.)

One problem I can see in your definition is the phrase "the ability
to take decisions", because it looks like it may bring in all of
the usual philosophical issues such as "could have done otherwise".
Also, what's required for one to have this ability?  Someone who thinks
"agent causation" is required for free will might still think that
of free will as you define it, because they may think it's required
for someone to "take a decision".

>One counter-example that I already gave is someone who wants to be healthy
>but at the same time drinks a gallon of whiskey each day 'cause he/she can't
>help it.

Is that meant as a counterexample to the definition?  Or is it just
a case where someone's will is not free.  (Perhaps the will is free
(so to speak) in some cases but not others.  For example, maybe I
cannot decide whether or not to like chocolate ice cream but can
decise whether or not to buy it on a particular occasion.)

>"Fine, but what is this defintion useful to ?"
>Well, it helps define moral responsibility, [...]

>When someone lacks free will then this person is not morally responsible.
>"Why not?"
>Simply because it is useless to punish this person.
>"Why useless ?"
>Because the threat of punishement (i.e. threat of something expected
>to go against the core desires of the person) cannot be taken into 
>account by the person in her/his decision process.

Why not?  Is it meant to be part of the definition of "core desires"?

>[...]

>Now, of course, "core personality" should be defined carefully and
>one big reason to lack free will is precisely not to have a clearly
>defined core personality.

Perhaps that's a reason to question your definition.  Suppose
someone lacks a clearly defined core personailty.  Why would
they therefore lack free will?  Perhaps all of us have some
lack of clarity in the definition of our core personalities.
But why would that make our wills less free?

>[...]

>So the interestng thing would be to refine the above definition which is 
>of course very rough, rather than arguing forever whether or not
>free will and determinism are compatible.

I'd agree that the net discussion does not make much progress.
Moreover, it can make sense to address questions such as whether
free will and determinism are compatible by considering what
follows from various definitions of "free will".  But problems
remain.  For instance, if someone is convinced that free will
and determinism are not compatible, they may count that as a
point against a definition that would make them compatible.

You might then say "well, what is _your_ definition?".  But to
that they could reply (and reasonably so, IMO) that they don't
yet have a precise definition but nonetheless feel that a
defintion must satisfy certain constraints.  (You seem to 
feel that too, hence your remarks on responsibility.)

There are a number if ways such a discussion could (reasonably)
go, too many for me to present all the ramifications here.
But I suspect that all of the usual free will issues can
still (reasonably) come up, one way or another.

Moreover, we might in any case want to understand why various
people have thought that free will and determinism were not
(or where) compatible.  There are arguments, examples, etc,
as well as (explicit) definitions of various sorts.

An excellent recent book that I again recommend is:

   Metaphysics of Free Will

   Description: Explains the sort of control that is associated with
   personhood and accountability, and shows how it is consistent with
   causal determinism (or God's existence). Thus, our view of ourselves
   as morally responsible agents can be protected against the challenges
   posed by science and religion.

   Author: John Martin Fischer
   Publisher: Basil Blackwell Inc
   Binding: [paper]
   ISBN: 1557868573
   Price: 14.99 [Pounds UK]
   Year published: 1995

(This from "BookSearch" via http://www.blackwell.co.uk/bookshops/)

-- jeff
