Newsgroups: alt.philosophy.objectivism,alt.sci.physics.new-theories,sci.physics,comp.ai,comp.ai.philosophy,sci.philosophy.meta,alt.memetics,alt.extropians
Path: cantaloupe.srv.cs.cmu.edu!bb3.andrew.cmu.edu!newsfeed.pitt.edu!gatech!newsfeed.internetmci.com!in2.uu.net!nb.rockwell.com!mrbig!glass
From: glass@mrbig.rockwell.com (Jim Glass)
Subject: Re: Randomness and free will
Message-ID: <1996Feb2.145941.11220@nb.rockwell.com>
Sender: glass@mrbig (Jim Glass)
Organization: Rockwell Info Sys
References: <823175308.29461@ray.division.co.uk> <1996Feb1.192126.28158@nb.rockwell.com> <823262545.29003@ray.division.co.uk>
Date: Fri, 2 Feb 1996 14:59:41 GMT
Lines: 91
Xref: glinda.oz.cs.cmu.edu sci.physics:168754 comp.ai:36682 comp.ai.philosophy:37346 sci.philosophy.meta:24086

In article <823262545.29003@ray.division.co.uk>, ray@division.co.uk (Ray McConnell) writes:
|> yqg023@sunshine.rockwell.com ( Jim Glass ; JF ; GLASS ; x586-0375 ;
|> (W) ; 634-000) wrote:
|> 
|> >In article <823175308.29461@ray.division.co.uk>, ray@division.co.uk (Ray McConnell) writes:
|> >|> 
|> >|> Surely the issue here is wether there really is 
|> >|> such a thing as randomness. 
|> >|> 
|> >|> Our limited perceptions cause us to simplify the universe
|> >|> and call complex (maybe unknowable) phenomenum as
|> >|> 'Random'. It is useful to call this complexity 'random' as we have
|> >|> no way to grasp the enormity of universal cause and effect.
|> >|> 
|> >|> These simplifications give rise to such things as language,
|> >|> conciosness and the perception of free will.
|> >|> 
|> >|> So free will and determinism are not contradictory, 
|> >|> free will is a simplification we can grasp.
|> >|> 
|> >|> Ray
|> >|> 
|> >|> 
|> 
|> >There is a difference between one's inability to predict an event 
|> >or series of events and non-determinism.
|> 
|> Fine, I agree.
|> 
|> >I.e., just because you are not competent to predict something does NOT
|> >imply it is not determined.
|> 
|> Umm..
|> 
|> >If free will depends on random processes, it is a poor and unsatisfying
|> >form of 'free' will.
|> 
|> Its the nature of 'random' that seems to be causing the hangup here.
|> 
|> >A random robot is still a robot.
|> 
|> >It seems to me that science and mathematics have evolved good definitions
|> >and even measures of "randomness", which are far more rigorous and precise
|> >than your statement that randomness results merely from our perception of
|> >complexity.
|> 
|> Undoubtably, I'm no mathematician, but I defy you to be able tell the
|> difference from an observational point of view. (I gues we could
|> extend the argument to the self referencial observation of observation
|> of so called randomness, that might be quite interesting)
|> 
|> >In other words, I disagree with nearly every word you posted.
|> 
|> >Isn't that special?
|> 
|> Yes I expected that somebody would. There are two positions to take,
|> that is: there is so called 'genuine randomness' and there APPEARS_to
|> be_genuine  randomness. I propose that you can't tell which it is and
|> further it is not possible to KNOW which is the case.
|> 
|> Ray.
|> 
|> 
|> 

Seems that this boils down to the question of whether or not there is
an external reality or whether it's all in our heads.  Most of us choose 
to believe that there is a 'real' reality beyond our thick skulls that
we imperfectly perceive with our senses.  Others point out that we cannot
PROVE that it's not all in our heads, i.e., that there may be no such thing
as 'external' reality...and then 'dare' us to prove otherwise.

I find such discussions unrewarding, but that's just me.

I thought we were talking about free will vs determinism and suddenly
we are talking about epistemology.  

As I (dimly) recall, information scientists define randomness by the
length of the algorithm necessary to repeat the allegedly random sequence.

A non-random sequence can be reproduced by an algorithm with is substantially
shorter than the sequence itself; a "truly" random one requires an algorithm
at least as long (bitwise) as the sequence it describes.

I suspect that thermodynamics could become involved, i.e., asserting something
like the proposition that a random sequence is a sequence of maximal entropy.

Got a problem with that?

Jim Glass

